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DELAYED FIGHT: THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM, NEGOTIATION, AND THE 
TRANSATLANTIC CONFLICT OVER 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 
Ron Kendler* 
Abstract: For over thirty years, the United States and the European Union 
have waged a bitter and seemingly eternal political battle over the manu-
facture and trade of large commercial aircraft. In 2005, they brought this 
dispute to the World Trade Organization by litigating through its Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. With the arrival of decisions from the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body, this long-running conflict enters a new phase. This 
Note proposes that DSM litigation will result in a negotiated settlement be-
tween the two parties. Starting with the histories of both the DSM and the 
LCA industry, it delineates how the WTO has created a system that con-
tinually encourages states to settle through the DSM’s textual provisions 
and extrinsic effects. The Note analyzes why and how a negotiated settle-
ment will come about, building upon the settlement-oriented nature of 
the DSM and the industry’s history. 
Introduction 
 Halfway through its second decade, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is experiencing growing pains.1 Its current trade liberalization 
negotiations, the Doha Round, continue to stagnate2 as its goal of en-
couraging free trade has suffered in the wake of the global recession 
and protectionism by some states.3 Also, one of its key accomplishments, 
the quasi-judicial Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), has come un-
 
* Ron Kendler is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. He would like to thank Frank J. Garcia and John Gordon for their guidance; Noah 
Hampson, Lauren Campbell, and Megan Felter for their editorial assistance; and his fam-
ily, friends, and mentors for their support. Additional thanks to Kerry A. Chase, Richard 
Albert, and Daniel Lyons for their initial advisement, and to involved attorneys and WTO 
officials for their insights into this case. 
1 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Give Up on Deliverables Pact, to Push for Work Program to 
Advance Doha, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1228 ( July 28, 2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Defying Gravity and History, Economist, Aug. 7, 2010, at 72. 
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der increasing criticism.4 Even those who praise its efficacy concede that 
the DSM needs reform and has fallen short of resolving large, complex, 
and contentious international trade disputes.5 
 The transatlantic dispute over commercial aircraft is a prime ex-
ample of such a complex and contentious case.6 Over the last three 
decades, firms in the United States and the European Union (EU) 
(and its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC)) have 
engaged in a high-stakes commercial competition to manufacture and 
sell commercial planes with over 100 seats, known as large commercial 
aircraft (LCA).7 This industry is especially lucrative: the combination of 
high-technology characteristics generating beneficial “spillover” effects 
and annual sales averaging over $100 billion lead governments to take 
an active interest in the success of their domestic aircraft firms.8 Addi-
tionally, the market dynamics of commercial aircraft production have 
created a duopoly: the world’s sole two producers of LCA are the Unit-
ed States’ Boeing and the EU’s Airbus.9 
 This competition is fierce, and the two sides do not perceive it as 
fair.10 Both firms receive financial support from their governments– 
Boeing through indirect subsidization in the form of U.S. military con-
tracts and tax incentives, and Airbus through direct EU subsidies.11 
Such behavior has led to allegations by both sides that the other is gain-
                                                                                                                      
4 See, e.g., Webb McArthur, Reforming Fairness: The Need for Legal Pragmatism in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process, 9 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 229, 232 (2010). 
5 See, e.g., id. 
6 See Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO’s “Toughest” Case: An Examination of the Effectiveness 
of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute over Aircraft Subsidies, 71 J. 
Air L. & Com. 191, 193–94 (2006). 
7 See John Newhouse, Boeing Versus Airbus: The Inside Story of the Greatest 
International Competition in Business, at ix–xi (2007). 
8 Terrence R. Guay, Boeing, Airbus, and the Transatlantic Aerospace Industry 10 (Mar. 
22–25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
9 Robert J. Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: A Sequel, Global 
Econ. J., 2004, at 1, 1–2. 
10 Each party frequently aims to portray the facts to its advantage; for example, in Jan-
uary 2011, Boeing and Airbus issued diametrically opposed press releases in response to 
the same WTO decision. Compare Press Release, Boeing Co., Boeing Response to Public 
Reports Regarding the WTO’s Final Ruling in DS 353 ( Jan. 31, 2011), available at http:// 
boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1603 (“[T]he WTO’s decisions confirm that 
European launch aid stands alone as a massive illegal subsidy only available to Airbus . . . .”), 
with Press Release, Airbus, WTO Ruling: Billions in Boeing Subsidies Distort Competition 
( Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/press-re- 
lease-detail/detail/wto-ruling-billions-in-boeing-subsidies-distort-competition/ (“Boeing has 
received massive and illegal government subsidies for many decades . . . .”). 
11 Nina Pavcnik, Trade Disputes in the Commercial Aircraft Industry, 25 World Econ. 733, 
738–39 (2002). 
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ing an unfair advantage, and each has attempted to alter the other’s pol-
icy.12 These attempts have at times resulted in interstate agreements, 
both bilateral and through the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).13 Yet the dispute has also resulted 
in public condemnation and confrontation through litigation and trade 
restrictions.14 
                                                                                                                     
 In June 2005, the United States filed a DSM claim, alleging illegal 
EU subsidization of Airbus;15 the EU immediately launched a counter-
suit against the United States and Boeing.16 The case is the largest and 
one of the most complex ever submitted to the DSM,17 taking five years 
for the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) panel to issue its decision in the 
U.S. case.18 An average DSM case takes approximately twelve months 
from filing to decision adoption.19 
 Per WTO procedure, the decision in the U.S. case remained confi-
dential until the final public report was issued in June 2010.20 The re-
port contains the Panel’s ruling that some of the EU’s “launch aid” of 
loans and other financial support constitutes a violation of WTO agree-
ments, as well as enforcement mechanisms to terminate such subsidiza-
tion.21 A separate panel released its decision in the EU suit in March 
2011, labeling various U.S. policies as illegal.22 
 
12 See John G. Francis & Alex F. Pevzner, Airbus and Boeing: Strengths and Limitations of 
Strong States, 121 Pol. Sci. Q. 629, 646–50 (2006). 
13 Keith Hayward, Trade Disputes in the Commercial Aircraft Industry: A Back-
ground Note 5–6 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.raes.org.uk/raes/pdfs/Trade_war_ 
Full.pdf. 
14 See id. at 6. 
15 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communi-
ties—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/2 ( June 3, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. DSM Filing]. 
16 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United 
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/2 ( June 3, 2005) [herein-
after EU DSM Filing]. 
17 See Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 242–43 (2006); see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO 
Signals Long Delay in Issuing Ruling on EU’s Appeal Against Airbus Decision, 27 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1482 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
18 Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling in U.S. Complaint 
Against Airbus Subsidies, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1188 (Sept. 10, 2009). 
19 See John H. Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 
1 Brookings Trade F. 179, 210 (2000). 
20 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Ruling Slams Illegal Subsidies for Europe’s Airbus in Case 
Brought by U.S., 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1029 (July 8, 2010). 
21 See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Air-
craft, ¶¶ 8.1–.8, WT/DS316/R ( June 30, 2010) [hereinafter DS316 Panel Report]. 
22 See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), ¶¶ 8.1–.10, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter DS353 Panel Report]. 
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 With these decisions, this long-running dispute enters a new phase.23 
Both parties have appealed both decisions, making it likely that the con-
flict will continue to play out for some time.24 Nevertheless, this Note 
argues that the United States and the EU will likely renew negotiations 
in an effort to resolve their differences rather than pursue DSB-man-
dated measures.25 Under the right circumstances, as found in the his-
tory of this case, the DSM pushes states to negotiate and settle their dis-
putes, even in the midst of litigation.26 This settlement effect should be 
considered one of the DSM’s successes.27 
 Part I of this Note reviews the histories of the DSM and the LCA 
industry, examining the nature and mechanisms of dispute settlement 
under the GATT and the WTO, as well as the economic and political 
aspects of LCA production. Part II discusses how the DSM, both 
through intrinsic structural provisions and extrinsic effects on state be-
havior, serves as a mechanism to bring states to the bargaining table. 
Part III puts forth this Note’s main argument—that the DSB generates 
settlement, and that it will do so in this case—through a comparison 
and analysis of two eras in the history of the dispute. In the mid-1980s, a 
similar process of public discord and utilization of GATT dispute settle-
ment ultimately led to a negotiated outcome, found in the 1992 U.S.-
EEC Bilateral Treaty on Civil Aircraft. This section thus highlights simi-
larities and common trends between the pre-1992 era and the contem-
porary era to predict that the most recent cases will result in a negoti-
ated settlement. The Note concludes by considering the DSM’s practical 
effects and the future of the LCA dispute in light of its main argument. 
I. Background 
A. The Evolution of Dispute Settlement Under the GATT and WTO 
 As the Allies pushed through the final year of World War II, they 
sought to ensure that the economic and political failures that had cata-
                                                                                                                      
23 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Says EU Case Against WTO Ruling on Illegal Subsidies to Airbus 
Falls Short, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1806 (Nov. 25, 2010). 
24 See id. 
25 See discussion infra Part III. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 160–165, 256–274. 
27 See, e.g., Alexandra R. Harrington, They Fought for Trade but Did Trade Win? An Analy-
sis of the Trends Among Trade Disputes Brought by WTO Member States Before the WTO Dispute 
Resolution Body, 16 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 315, 339, 341 (2007) (“[The DSM] acts as a deter-
rent in many cases. . . . [It also] creat[es] a legal forum through which trade fights can be 
waged civilly and without major incursions into [state sovereignty].”). 
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lyzed the Great Depression, and in turn, the War, would not reoccur.28 
At a series of meetings in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, delegates 
from forty-four countries created three institutions to accomplish this 
goal: the International Monetary Fund; the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development; and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).29 
 Although the parties built the first two to their final form, the 
GATT was a placeholder, to be succeeded by a more comprehensive 
International Trade Organization.30 Negotiations to create the Interna-
tional Trade Organization took place in Havana in 1948, but the U.S. 
Congress refused to ratify the resulting Havana Charter.31 As such, the 
GATT’s formative treaty, known as “GATT 1947,” became a de facto in-
ternational institution, smaller and less developed than its contempo-
raries.32 
 Over the next five decades, the GATT developed through a series 
of negotiation “rounds” through which its contracting parties sought 
mutual reductions in trade barriers through international bargaining.33 
The eighth such round, the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), replaced the 
GATT with the WTO and sought to strengthen the former’s mandate 
and institutional presence through additional, more extensive treaties 
and a larger bureaucratic apparatus.34 
                                                                                                                      
28 See John W. Pehle, The Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 Yale L.J. 1127, 1128 (1946). 
29 See Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A Balance 
Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 31, 32 (2008). 
30 See id. at 36, 55; Steven Nathaniel Zane, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: The Interna-
tional Legality of Carbon Tariffs in the EU, 34 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 199, 206 (2011). 
31 Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade Law: Prob-
lems, Cases, and Materials 20, 25 (2008); Jeffry Clay Clark, The United States Proposal for a 
General Agreement on Trade in Services and Its Preemption of Inconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. Int’l 
& Comp. L. Rev. 75, 78 (1992). 
32 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note 31, at 20, 25. The IMF and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development together received $15 million and two-member Boards 
of Governors supported by a dozen Executive Directors each; the GATT received $1.5 
million for its first two years and a Secretariat of ten senior staff, two of whom were on loan 
from the United Nations. See Establishment of Bretton Woods Institutions, 32 Fed. Res. Bull. 
361, 361–62, 372 (1946); U.N. Secretary-General, Costs of the Conference of Trade and Employ-
ment and Its Preparatory Committee, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/38 (Feb. 7, 1948); Press Release, 
European Office, United Nations ITO Interim Commission Established at Geneva, U.N. 
Press Release No. 420 (Aug. 11, 1948). 
33 See Gardner, supra note 29, at 56. Such bargaining also generated corollary agree-
ments to the GATT 1947. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1, 20 (2005). 
34 See Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 24–25. 
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 From the outset, key GATT provisions addressed dispute settle-
ment,35 but entailed weak enforcement and great deference to state 
autonomy.36 As a result, one of the Uruguay Round’s notable contribu-
tions reformed GATT dispute settlement through a new treaty, the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU).37 GATT and WTO dispute set-
tlement has played a central role in the LCA dispute.38 
1. GATT Dispute Settlement, 1947–1995 
 GATT dispute settlement emphasized negotiation and amicable 
resolution of trade disputes, rather than rules or quasi-judicial institu-
tions.39 This approach sought the withdrawal of measures considered 
illicit under the GATT without imposing too legalistic a framework that 
would offend sovereignty and thus reduce state participation.40 
 Two Articles, XXII and XXIII, are the central elements of GATT 
1947 that address the settlement of trade disputes, though they later 
led to additional clarifying policy statements and were eventually sup-
plemented by the DSU.41 Article XXII requires parties to “accord sym-
pathetic consideration to [one another] with respect to . . . all matters 
affecting the operation of this Agreement.”42 In the case that two or 
more contracting parties fail to find a “satisfactory adjustment,” they 
may consult in order to do so.43 In other words, if a GATT signatory 
believed that another signatory pursued trade practices that violated 
the treaty, the other signatory would have to consider the allegations in 
good faith, and the two could negotiate an opportunity to bring the 
policy into accordance with the GATT.44 
                                                                                                                      
 
35 See id. at 10. In light of pre-GATT protectionism, states sought to monitor each oth-
er’s commitment to free trade and challenge digressions from this commitment. See id. 
36 See id. at 13. Such deference relates to states’ desire to maintain control over their 
economies and the anarchic nature of international relations. See id. This concern led 
states and policymakers to see GATT as an institution where political flexibility and sover-
eignty trumped adherence to developing legal standards. See id. 
37 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note 31, at 52. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 102–159. 
39 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dis-
pute Settlement System 3, 30 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). 
40 See Gardner, supra note 29, at 55–56. 
41 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XXII, XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; Jackson, supra note 19, at 184–85. 
42 GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXII. 
43 Id. art. XXIII. 
44 See id. This provision is a “broad general authorization for consultation among par-
ties,” which thus encourages a possible mutually agreed-upon solution as the first step in 
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 The second key provision, Article XXIII, highlights three potential 
interstate disagreements concerning trade policy: violation, whereby a 
GATT state fails to “carry out its obligations;” non-violation, whereby a 
GATT state can contest another’s policy, even if the policy does not vio-
late treaty obligations; and “any other situation.”45 The disputing par-
ties would refer the issue to the GATT Council, a general body open to 
all members which would meet once a month.46 The Council would 
appoint a panel, which would review the parties’ arguments.47 The 
panel would determine whether the measure in question “nullified or 
impaired” any “benefit” that a contracting party expected under the 
GATT, or if it impeded any other treaty objectives.48 
 Once the panel reached a conclusion, it issued a report; if it found 
nullification or impairment, it could recommend (but not mandate) 
“in order of preference:” removal of the measure, compensation of the 
injured party, or retaliation.49 To take effect, the report must have been 
adopted unanimously by the GATT Council.50 This led member states 
to contend that the institution was unable to enforce panel decisions.51 
Additional GATT treaties, such as the Subsidies Code and the Agree-
ment on Trade in Civil Aircraft, contained similar mechanisms and ref-
erences to Articles XXII and XXIII.52 
                                                                                                                      
the GATT dispute settlement process. John H. Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settle-
ment of Trade Disputes, 61 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 144, 149 (1967). 
45 GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXIII. 
46 See Petersmann, supra note 39, at 34–35. While the treaty itself defined basic guide-
lines and violations, it left the finer points of dispute settlement process and remedies 
open to interpretation and clarification, which later occurred through procedures, policy 
statements, and customary developments by and within the institution itself. See GATT 
1947, supra note 41, arts. XXII–XXIII; Petersmann, supra note 39, at 35–36. 
47 See Petersmann, supra note 39, at 34–35. 
48 GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXIII. 
49 William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Int’l L.J. 51, 59–60 (1987). 
50 Id. at 94 (“[I]f the losing party prevents formation of a consensus, the report is not 
adopted and has no effect.”). Though GATT 1947 did not prescribe unanimous adoption, 
weak enforcement and customary development led to “consensus [as] the traditional 
method of resolving disputes.” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Dec-
laration of 29 November 1982, L/5424, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 16 (1983). 
51 See Davey, supra note 49, at 85–88. Given unanimous adoption and panels’ limited 
recommendation abilities, a losing party could effectively block unfavorable findings. See 
id. at 85. 
52 See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 18, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D (26th 
Supp.) at 77 [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft art. 8.8, 
Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 167–68 [hereinafter Civil Aircraft Agree-
ment]. 
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 Member states thus criticized GATT dispute settlement as weak and 
ineffective.53 Even after developments in the 1970s and 1980s that 
commentators deemed the “legalization” of the process,54 dispute set-
tlement was still hampered by noncompliance, politicization, and “fo-
rum-shopping” among the various GATT corollary agreements.55 Thus, 
when policymakers set out to transform the GATT into the WTO, they 
sought to further the growing sense of “legalization” in dispute settle-
ment.56 
2. The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 1995–Present 
 Dispute settlement under the WTO is much more rigorous, time-
sensitive, and rules oriented.57 In response to decades of criticism, 
GATT member states set out to address the system’s flaws through a 
new treaty exclusively committed to dispute settlement.58 Known as the 
DSU, this part of the Uruguay Round codified the DSM.59 
 Under the DSU, dispute initiation is similar to GATT: Article 4 re-
quires the contesting party to seek consultations with the offending 
party to discuss the measure in question.60 These consultations can last 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Davey, supra note 49, at 61–62. 
54 Petersmann, supra note 39, at 48. States began to view panels as a “right” under the 
GATT, and panels themselves (increasingly comprised of legal professionals) began to 
utilize (1) previous decisions as non-binding precedent, and (2) customary methods of 
treaty interpretation, among other institutional developments initiated by the GATT 
Council. Id. 
55 Id. at 53–54. 
56 See Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 18–20. As the GATT developed between 1947 and the 
Uruguay Round’s conclusion in 1994, member states gained comfort with conceding au-
tonomy in order to promote trade liberalization. See id. at 18–24 (describing the GATT’s 
“quiet mutation” toward “harder law” and highlighting “a mounting belief in the rule of 
law amongst GATT parties . . . .”). The focus of GATT’s development thus shifted from 
avoiding the creation of legal standards to encouraging and adhering to them. See id. at 18. 
57 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. Despite adherence to “the principles” of 
Articles XXII and XXIII, WTO members emphasize “prompt settlement . . . in accordance 
with [states’ DSU] rights and obligations,” implying that the DSM is more time sensitive 
and stricter than GATT dispute settlement. Id. arts. 3.1, 3.3, 3.4. 
58 See id. art. 1. 
59 Taunya McLarty, GATT 1994 Dispute Settlement: Sacrificing Diplomacy for Efficiency in the 
Multilateral Trading System?, 9 Fla. J. Int’l L. 241, 264 (1994). At the time, the DSU was 
seen as a landmark step; analysts noted that the DSM “reflect[s] a legal system more so 
than ever in the history of GATT.” Id. at 268. 
60 DSU, supra note 57, art. 4.3. 
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up to sixty days, during which the complaining party can ask the WTO 
Council, acting as the DSB, to form a panel.61 
 Article 8 outlines the creation of panels, noting that they shall con-
tain three panelists who are “well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals.”62 If there are multiple related complaints, 
Article 9 enables the formation of a single panel to address all of 
them.63 Per Article 12, the panel has six months (three if the matter is 
deemed urgent) from the date of composition to hear arguments and 
evaluate the case.64 If this is not possible, Article 12 sets a strict deadline 
of nine months.65 All panel proceedings are confidential.66 
 Following the above steps, the panel issues its findings to the con-
testing parties through an interim report and provides them an oppor-
tunity to review the report before it is fully circulated to the DSB;67 the 
panel sets the time period during which parties may raise concerns or 
objections.68 After interim review, the panel submits the report to the 
DSB, which adopts it after a maximum of sixty days unless it refuses, by 
consensus, to do so.69 
 Unlike GATT, the WTO DSM process need not end with the panel. 
Instead, Article 17 allows a party to appeal a panel decision; three mem-
bers of the Appellate Body (AB), a rotating group comprised of seven 
individuals serving four-year terms, hear the appeal.70 The AB’s jurisdic-
tion is limited to issues of law raised and concluded by the panel, and it 
cannot remand cases to panels.71 It has sixty, and never more than nine-
ty, days to execute its proceedings, after which the DSB adopts its find-
ings within thirty days of the decision.72 The entire process is designed 
to take nine to twelve months, depending on whether or not a party ap-
peals the panel decision.73 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. art. 4.7. 
62 Id. arts. 8.1, 8.5. 
63 Id. art. 9.1. 
64 Id. art. 12.8. 
65 Id. art. 12.9. 
66 DSU, supra note 57, art. 14.1. 
67 Id. art. 15.2. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. art. 16.4. 
70 Id. arts. 17.1, 17.2. 
71 Id. art. 17.6; John Lockhart & Tania Voon, Reviewing Appellate Review in the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement System, 6 Melb. J. Int’l L. 474, 483 (2005). 
72 DSU, supra note 57, arts. 17.5, 17.14. 
73 Id. art. 20. This provision responds to states’ criticism of the GATT’s delays in panel 
processes and decisions. See Davey, supra note 49, at 83–85. 
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 After the final report, the DSB meets, requiring the “losing” party 
to implement the panel or AB’s recommendations.74 The party can 
propose, and the DSB must approve, a “reasonable period of time” for 
implementation.75 If the party does not implement the recommenda-
tions, the parties must then negotiate compensation.76 If they fail to do 
so within twenty days, the DSB allows the “winning” party to enact re-
taliatory measures aimed at countering the policy in question, starting 
with the relevant sector and potentially expanding into others.77 
 The development of the DSM was a direct reaction to states’ disap-
pointment with and concerns over circumvention under78 the weak en-
forcement and lax standards of GATT dispute settlement. The DSM, in 
addition to addressing this disappointment, demonstrates the amount 
of sovereignty that states are willing to concede in the area of interna-
tional trade to ensure cooperation.79 In order to comprehend current 
prospects for settlement, however, an understanding of the economic 
dynamics and political history of LCA is also necessary. 
B. An Economic and Political History of the Transatlantic LCA Dispute 
 In order to understand why the DSM will generate a negotiated 
resolution in this case, it is important to comprehend the history of the 
LCA dispute. Specifically, an explanation of the economic and business 
foundations of aircraft production and the surrounding international 
political developments is crucial. 
1. The Commercial Aircraft Industry: An Economic and Business 
Background 
a. Economic Dynamics and Their Political Effects 
 According to economists, commercial aircraft manufacturing en-
tails factors that make market entry and success uniquely difficult.80 
                                                                                                                      
 
74 DSU, supra note 57, art. 21.3. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. art. 22.1. 
77 Id. arts. 22.2–.3. 
78 See Davey, supra note 49, at 85–88. 
79 See Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 3. 
80 See Newhouse, supra note 7, at 67–68 (noting that long life cycles of aircraft and er-
ratic demand by airlines forces producers to invest in both current and future products); 
Keith Hartley, Aerospace: The Political Economy of an Industry, in The Structure of Euro-
pean Industry 307, 316, 325 (H.W. de Jong ed., 1993) (explaining how high research and 
development (R&D) costs require firms to spend billions of dollars before they can manu-
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Many conclude that, because of these factors, the market naturally con-
solidates over time81—resulting in the Boeing-Airbus duopoly82—and 
requiring subsidization in order to exist and flourish.83 
 In the United States, subsidization occurs through the military-
industrial complex.84 Private aerospace firms amass funds and technical 
knowledge through military contracts, which effectively subsidize their 
commercial programs.85 This generates further ties between the civilian 
government and these firms, which are already strong because policy-
makers believe that the industry is economically important.86 
 In Europe, governments subsidize commercial aircraft manufac-
turing through more direct means.87 Since its founding in the mid-
1960s, Airbus has received various forms of direct subsidies from multi-
ple European governments, including France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain.88 As with the United States, commentators note 
                                                                                                                      
 
facture and sell enough aircraft in order to profit, and that these firms operate under 
economies of scale, in which product price decreases as production increases). 
81 See Vicki L. Golich, From Competition to Cooperation: The Challenge of Commercial-Class 
Aircraft Manufacturing, 46 Int’l Org. 899, 903–04 (1992). 
82 Pavcnik, supra note 11, at 739. 
83 See generally Richard Baldwin & Paul Krugman, Industrial Policy and International Com-
petition in Wide-Bodied Jet Aircraft, in Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis 45 
(Robert E. Baldwin ed., 1988) (explaining the political and economic rationale for sub-
sidization). 
84 See Walter Adams & William James Adams, The Military-Industrial Complex: A Market 
Structure Analysis, 62 Am. Econ. R. 279, 279–80 (1972) (summarizing the military-industrial 
complex as the close relationship between the U.S. defense establishment and private in-
dustry). 
85 See Francis & Pevzner, supra note 12, at 635. Military programs generate commer-
cially beneficial technological “spillover” effects and benefits such as access to military 
infrastructure and testing equipment. See id; see also EU DSM Filing, supra note 16, at 7–8 
(listing specific R&D subsidies provided by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)). 
86 See, e.g., Ian McIntyre, Dogfight: The Transatlantic Battle over Airbus 82 
(1992) (discussing aircraft executives’ assistance in developing policy during congressional 
enactment of the 1974 Trade Act); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Vikas Bajaj, In India, Obama 
Courts Corporate America, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2010, at A8 (noting Boeing CEO Jim McNer-
ney’s role as head of President Barack Obama’s Export Council). The U.S. aerospace in-
dustry has the country’s highest positive trade balance of all manufacturing industries, 
valued at $47.2 billion in 2009. Int’l Trade Admin., Dep’t of Commerce, Flight Plan 
2010: Analysis of the U.S. Aerospace Industry 2 (2010). 
87 See U.S. DSM Filing, supra note 15, at 1–4. Even before Airbus, national aircraft firms 
were state-owned or subsidized, leading some to argue that divergent attitudes toward sub-
sidization in the United States and the EU are based on fundamentally different philoso-
phies of political economy, culture, and governance. See Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 
195–97. 
88 See U.S. DSM Filing, supra note 15, at 1–4. Such subsidization, commonly known as 
“launch aid,” has included attractively rated loans, direct R&D funding, and equity infu-
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the overlap between European leaders’ policy goals and Airbus execu-
tives’ business aims.89 Beyond subsidization itself, the development of 
the industry provides additional insight into this dispute. 
b. The Transatlantic Duopoly and Specter of Future Competitors 
 In the late 1940s, U.S. aircraft firms, buoyed by World War II, tran-
sitioned to commercial aerospace as a way to ensure future success, but 
continued to rely primarily on existing propeller technology.90 French 
and British competitors, possessing less market share and industrial ca-
pacity, sought to generate demand through a new, faster product: the 
jet airliner.91 Due to a combination of circumstances, they failed in this 
venture, enabling American firms to continue their domination of the 
industry.92 Boeing capitalized on these circumstances and its military 
connections to develop the 707 jetliner.93 Thereafter, from the mid-
1950s through the late 1970s, Boeing led a small number of American 
firms that dominated the global market for commercial aircraft.94 
                                                                                                                      
 
sions. See id.; see also Gellman Research Assocs., An Economic and Financial Review 
of Airbus Industrie, at 2–5, B6–B17 (1990) [hereinafter Gellman Report]. 
89 See David Weldon Thornton, Airbus Industrie: The Politics of an Interna-
tional Industrial Collaboration 118 (1995). Airbus’s history contains many instances 
of European leaders placing Airbus at the top of their agendas, including financing, advo-
cating, and even lobbying for its aircraft on diplomatic trips. See id.; see also Newhouse, 
supra note 7, at 131, 186, 191. 
90 See Bill Yenne, The Story of the Boeing Company 144, 150 (updated ed. 2010). 
91 See Harry Lawrence, Aviation and the Role of Government 147, 157 (2004). 
92 See id. at 148, 313–14. The British deHavilland Comet failed due to structural issues 
that led the British government to deem it inherently unsafe. See id. at 148. Other planes, 
such as the French Sud Caravelle, faced a lack of market access and low interest from air-
lines. See id. at 314. 
93 See id. at 149. Some of the 707’s design came from Boeing’s highly successful B-47 
and B-52 bombers. Id. The aircraft would also serve multiple military roles, including as 
mid-air refueling tankers and intelligence aircraft. See The Complete Encyclopedia of 
World Aircraft 164–67 (David Donald ed., 1999) [hereinafter Aircraft Encyclope-
dia]. 
94 See Lawrence, supra note 91, at 321–22. The 707 enabled Boeing to introduce three 
new aircraft in the 1960s: the medium-range 727; the short-range 737; and the iconic 747 
“jumbo jet,” the first widebody (dual aisle) aircraft. See Aircraft Encyclopedia, supra 
note 93, at 168–72; Marc C.S. Mathis, Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute Stale-
mate Between Boeing and Airbus Has Undermined GATT and May Continue to Usher In an Era of 
International Agreement Obsolescence Under the World Trade Organization, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 177, 183 (2005). The late 1970s saw Boeing introduce the medium-range 757 and 
the medium-/long-range 767, a response to the Airbus A300 and A310. Thornton, supra 
note 89, at 110; cf. Baldwin & Krugman, supra note 83 at 47–51 (discussing the similarities 
between the 767 and A300 and noting the latter’s entry into service eight years prior to the 
former). In the 1990s, Boeing introduced the 777 “minijumbo,” followed by the largely 
composite and more energy-efficient 787 in the 2000s. Newhouse, supra note 7, at 8; see 
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 Across the Atlantic, industrial and political leaders continued their 
effort to challenge U.S. dominance by utilizing the trend of European 
integration to promote collaboration in aerospace.95 By the late 1960s, 
France, Great Britain, and West Germany had established the Airbus 
consortium, pooling national firms’ resources and capabilities to pro-
duce the groundbreaking A300,96 followed by a series of other planes 
that would challenge U.S. products.97 At the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, Airbus eclipsed Boeing, its sole competitor, in market share.98 
Though the two have since traded places, the market remains split be-
tween them, pitting the two companies in a tit-for-tat development and 
sales cycle.99 
 The duopoly’s days are likely numbered: firms in Brazil, Canada, 
China, and Russia are developing commercial aircraft due to enter ser-
vice in the next decade, which will directly challenge Boeing and Air-
bus’s market share.100 Nevertheless, the duopoly’s rise and surrounding 
controversy over subsidies catalyzed international political and legal 
action over the last three decades, pitting the United States against the 
EU.101 
                                                                                                                      
Roger Renstrom, Boeing’s Big Gamble: Half-Plastic Dreamliner, Plastics News, July 2, 2007, at 
4. 
95 See Mcintyre, supra note 86, at 9–11. Following World War II, European leaders 
merged production and planning in crucial sectors such as coal and steel so as to avoid 
war; this process set off further economic and political cooperation, eventually leading to 
the current EU system. See Jonathan A.C. Wise, Note, Variable Geometry and the European 
Central Bank: How the ECB Can Assert Itself Against Attacks from Member States with Derogations, 
20 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 407, 407 (1997). Leaders cited aerospace as a sector that 
would benefit from such integration. See Mcintyre, supra note 86, at 9–11. 
96 Lawrence, supra note 91, at 318–19. The A300, for which ninety percent of costs 
were paid by subsidies, was the first widebody, twin-engined aircraft. See Gellman Report, 
supra note 88, at 2–5; Lawrence, supra note 91, at 162. 
97 See Lawrence, supra note 91, at 319, 322–25. Airbus developed a “family” of aircraft 
that share design traits, which reduced costs and increased competitiveness. See id. at 323–24. 
They include the A310, a shortened A300; the A320, a short-/medium-range narrowbody 
that competes with the 737; the A330/340, a twin- and/or quad-engined aircraft that com-
petes with the 767 and 777; the double-decker A380, which surpassed the 747 as the world’s 
largest passenger aircraft; and the A350, a reaction to the 787. Id.; Thornton, supra note 89, 
at 108; Francis & Pevzner, supra note 12, at 643, 651; see Newhouse, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
98 Boeing Gets Back on Track, Economist, June 4, 2005, at 59–60. By this time, Airbus 
had become a largely private entity. See Newhouse, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
99 See Francis & Pevzner, supra note 12, at 651 (noting how Airbus answered Boeing’s 
787 with its A350, akin to the A330 but with a composite body and cleaner engines). 
100 See Robert Wall, After the Battle, Aviation Week & Space Tech., July 4, 2011, at 49. 
Canadian Bombardier’s C-Series, one such aircraft meant to compete with the A320 and 
737 (along with the Chinese COMAC C919 and Russian Irkut MS-21), has spurred Airbus 
and Boeing to offer updated versions of these venerable aircraft. See id. 
101 See infra text accompanying notes 102–159. 
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2. Surrounding International Political and Legal Developments 
a. A Developing Rivalry, the GATT Subsidies Code, and the 1979 Agreement 
on Trade in Civil Aircraft 
 The U.S. government first raised concerns over Europe’s subsidi-
zation of Airbus in the mid-1970s.102 The Europeans concurrently 
blocked trade in aircraft and alleged U.S. subsidization through mili-
tary funding and other financial instruments.103 Following this discord, 
the United States raised the aircraft dispute at the 1978 G7 summit, 
where leaders committed to “maximum freedom of trade possible in 
commercial aircraft.”104 The leaders maintained that the GATT’s Tokyo 
Round was the best mechanism through which such freedom of trade 
could be accomplished.105 
 Upon its conclusion in 1979, policymakers praised the Tokyo 
Round for being the first of its kind to address, inter alia, non-tariff bar-
riers to trade as well as specific sectors and industries.106 It heralded two 
important treaties with regard to the aircraft dispute: (1) the Subsidies 
                                                                                                                      
102 See American and Foreign Practices in the Financing of Large Commercial Aircraft Sales: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means 95th Cong. 84–85 
(1978) (statement of Paul T. O’Day, Deputy Director, Bureau of Domestic Bus. Dev., Dep’t 
of Commerce). American objections to, threats against, and investigation of European 
subsidization increased following Airbus’s first sale to a U.S. airline in 1977. See id. at 82; see 
also Trade Panel Probes Eastern Airbus Lease, Chi. Trib., June 24, 1977, at C9; Richard Witkin, 
U.S. Checking Airbus Accord, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1977, at D7. 
103 See Don Cook, Concorde Issue Stalls Deal: Boeing Fleet Sale in Holding Pattern, L.A. 
Times, Apr. 12, 1977, at D9; Suspension of Buying Certain Foreign Planes Announced by France, 
Wall St. J., June 13, 1977, at 12 (highlighting European trade blockages in response to 
U.S. government action against European aircraft’s landing and sales rights). In addition 
to military contracts, Boeing received favorable treatment from the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank in financing its international sales. See William M. Carley, Boeing Waging Rare Attack on 
Policies of Airbus Industrie in Selling Its A300, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1978, at 16. 
104 Gilbert R. Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation 
238–39 (1986). In full, states agreed to “the objective of negotiating maximum freedom of 
world trade in commercial aircraft parts, and related equipment, including elimination of 
duties and to the fullest extent possible, the reduction or elimination of trade restricting 
or distorting effects of other measures.” Statement by Several Delegations on Current Status of 
Tokyo Round Negotiations, 5, MTN/INF/33 ( July 14, 1978) [hereinafter Tokyo Round State-
ment], available at http://sul-derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=91910050&media 
Type=application/pdf (statement by the GATT on behalf of G7 Member States). 
105 Cf. Tokyo Round Statement, supra note 104, at 1, 5 (highlighting the aim of the Tokyo 
Round to generate mutual reductions in trade barriers in numerous sectors, including 
aircraft). 
106 D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo 
Round, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 51, 52, 56 (1983). 
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Code and (2) the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.107 By tackling 
subsidies, the former was the first international agreement to set a 
standard for what had long been an untouchable area of international 
trade law.108 Yet the shortcomings of the Subsidies Code soon became 
apparent.109 It conceded that subsidies “promote important objectives 
of social and economic policy” and asked signatories merely to “avoid 
causing” adverse effects on partner states.110 In terms of reprieve for 
states adversely affected by foreign subsidies, it allowed such states ei-
ther to impose unilateral countervailing duties against the subsidized 
items (already permitted under the GATT 1947),111 or to retaliate by 
subsidizing industries that export to the offending market, which was 
strongly discouraged.112 It also lacked an operational definition of the 
term “subsidy,” which caused further misinterpretation and discord.113 
 The Civil Aircraft Agreement, though lauded, also led to disap-
pointment.114 Language on credit and financing merely asked that 
“firms be provided with access to business opportunities on a competi-
tive basis.”115 Governments agreed to “avoid” sales inducements, not 
                                                                                                                      
107 Richard O. Cunningham & Peter Lichtenbaum, The Agreement on Trade in Civil Air-
craft and Other Issues Relating to Civil Aircraft in the GATT/WTO System, in The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 1165, 1167 (Patrick F.J. 
Macrory et al. eds., 2005). 
108 See Stephen D. Krasner, The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stabil-
ity in the Global Trading System, 23 Int’l Stud. Q. 491, 518 (1979) (“[T]he subsidies code 
does provide for some international surveillance in an area that had previously been an 
exclusively national domain.”). 
109 See Andrew L. Stoler, The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and the WTO, 44 J. 
World Trade 797, 802, 805 (2010) (“Although the improvements . . . appeared fairly ro-
bust, . . . [they] were clearly largely cosmetic. . . . The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code was a 
step forward in disciplining subsidies but its ineffective approach . . . meant that there was 
more to do [in] the Uruguay Round.”). 
110 Subsidies Code, supra note 52, arts. 8.1, 8.3. 
111 Id. art 4.3; see GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. II.2(b). 
112 See Subsidies Code, supra note 52, art. 13.4 (enabling states to resort to counter-
measures “in the event the [panel] recommendations are not followed”). Nevertheless, 
such discouragement did not stave off retaliatory action, which increased following the 
Tokyo Round. See Howard P. Marvel & Edward John Ray, Countervailing Duties, 105 Econ. J. 
1576, 1582–84 (1995). 
113 See Marvel & Ray, supra note 112, at 1578. 
114 See Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT’s Uruguay Round, 60 J. 
Air L. & Com. 1191, 1200–01 (1995). The Civil Aircraft Agreement appeared comprehen-
sive by “eliminating tariffs, prohibiting licensing requirements, and banning discrimina-
tory procurement,” but left much undone through its unclear connection to the Subsidies 
Code. Id. In other words, “the subsidy practices that had given Airbus an advantage were 
not addressed substantively in the GATT Tokyo Round.” Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 
198. 
115 Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 52, art. 4.3. 
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prohibit them.116 The treaty further stated that “governmental support, 
of itself, would not be deemed a distortion of trade.”117 Many labeled 
such language as weak, due to domestic political limits and the time 
constraints under which the parties negotiated.118 Nevertheless, the 
treaty and its resultant political circumstances would dictate the conflict 
for the next decade; by bringing the aircraft dispute into the GATT’s 
international forum and providing structural mechanisms such as dis-
pute settlement, the Civil Aircraft Agreement effectively broadened a 
bilateral diplomatic issue.119 
b. The 1992 Bilateral Agreement 
 The 1979 Civil Aircraft Agreement integrated the transatlantic dis-
pute into the GATT through the establishment of a Civil Aircraft 
Committee120 and the application of GATT dispute settlement to com-
mercial aircraft disagreements.121 The Committee’s records reveal how 
the United States and the EEC repeatedly and inconclusively aired their 
grievances.122 Yet policymakers stated their support for the Commit-
                                                                                                                      
116 Id. art. 4.4. 
117 Id. pmbl, at 162. 
118 See Tokyo Round Statement, supra note 104, at 1, 5 (dating the parties’ agreement to 
address aircraft subsidies to mid-1978, less than a year before the Tokyo Round’s conclu-
sion); Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., Revisiting U.S. Trade Policy: Decisions in Perspective 
167 (2000) (quoting then-Deputy Special Trade Representative Alan Wolff: “We formed a 
partnership with the European Community . . . we didn’t cure the Airbus problem, but 
each one of the problems [had] some idiosyncrasies to it. If you went to Boeing at the time 
and said, Should we go to war over whether Europe has an aircraft industry, the answer was 
no. The answer was no from Congress as well. One can only do what the domestic con-
stituency allows you to do in most instances.”). 
119 See Cunningham & Lichtenbaum, supra note 107, at 1168. 
120 See Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 52, art. 8.1 (“[The Civil Aircraft Commit-
tee] shall . . . afford[] Signatories the opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the 
operation of this Agreement . . . [and] to examine any matter for which it has not been 
possible to find a satisfactory solution through bilateral consultations . . . .”). 
121 See id. art. 8.8. Countries could utilize GATT dispute settlement by filing complaints 
with either the Civil Aircraft Committee or the Subsidies Committee. See id. 
122 See, e.g., Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre 
William Rappard on 10 October 1984, ¶¶ 21, 25–28, AIR/M/13 ( Jan. 7, 1985); Committee on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6–7 October 
1982, ¶¶ 28, 30, 32, AIR/M/9 ( Jan. 19, 1983); Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Minutes 
of the Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 28 and 30 October 1981, ¶¶ 23–27, AIR/M/6 
(Feb. 3, 1982); Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre 
William Rappard on 20 February 1980, ¶ 25, AIR/W/2 (Mar. 10, 1980). 
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tee,123 and industry and political leaders described it as a restraining 
force.124 
 By the mid-1980s, the two parties addressed the dispute through 
the GATT as well as bilaterally.125 Following the breakdown of these 
efforts, the United States utilized the Civil Aircraft Agreement’s second 
key contribution, GATT dispute settlement.126 Its complaint against the 
EEC concerned Germany’s debt forgiveness and an alleged exchange 
rate subsidy included in the privatization of its Airbus arm.127 The 
panel ruled that the subsidy was illicit under the Subsidies Code, after 
which the United States filed a broader case against all Airbus subsi-
dies.128 The Europeans responded by renewing bilateral negotiations, 
the result of which was the 1992 U.S.-EEC Bilateral Agreement.129 
                                                                                                                     
 The 1992 Bilateral Agreement explicitly built on the provisions of 
the 1979 Agreement130 by including more stringent limits on subsi-
dies.131 Notably, it involved several “escape clauses,” such as the exclu-
sion of equity infusions;132 “exceptional circumstances” under which the 
states could exempt themselves from its provisions;133 the ability to with-
 
123 See, e.g., Competitiveness of U.S. Commercial Aircraft Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th 
Cong. 4 (1987) (statement by S. Bruce Smart, Undersec’y for Int’l Trade, Dep’t of Com-
merce) (“[The Civil Aircraft Agreement] is the only GATT agreement that is specific to 
one industry. We place great importance upon its success . . . .”). 
124 See, e.g., id. at 60–62 (statement by James Worsham, Corporate Vice President, Aero-
space Group Executive, McDonnell Douglas Corp.) (discussing the positive influences of 
the Civil Aircraft Agreement). 
125 See McIntyre, supra note 86, at 242–44. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. In 1988, the German government sold Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), 
which owned Deutsche Airbus, to private firm Daimler-Benz (DB). Thornton, supra note 
89, at 136. To incentivize the sale, Germany absolved DB of past MBB debt, took a twenty 
percent share in a new company that would manage MBB’s Airbus interests, and agreed to 
protect any losses that DB would incur through exchange rate movements. Id. at 136–37. 
128 See Cunningham & Lichtenbaum, supra note 107, at 1171. 
129 Id. at 1171–72; see also Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT 
Agreement in Trade in Civil Aircraft, U.S.-EEC, July 17, 1992, KAV 3362 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter 1992 Bilateral Agreement]. 
130 1992 Bilateral Agreement, supra note 129, pmbl. at 3 (“[T]he GATT Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft should be strengthened with a view to progressively reducing the 
role of government support . . . in pursuit of [the parties’] common goal of preventing 
trade distortions resulting from direct or indirect government support for the develop-
ment and production of large civil aircraft . . . .”). 
131 See id. arts. 3–5. Under the Bilateral Agreement, direct support could constitute no 
more than thirty-three percent of an aircraft’s development costs, id. art. 4.2, and indirect 
support could constitute no more than three percent of the state’s national industry turn-
over, id. art. 5.2(a). 
132 Id. art. 7. 
133 Id. art. 9. 
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hold information on the basis of national security concerns;134 and the 
opportunity to withdraw from the treaty completely.135 Like its predeces-
sor, the 1992 Agreement was greeted with some skepticism, but also with 
hope that the dispute was momentarily resolved.136 
c. The Creation of the WTO and the 2005 DSM Filings 
 The aircraft dispute was not a focus issue during the Uruguay 
Round that led to the creation of the WTO.137 The conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in 1994, however, resulted in two institutional devel-
opments that would play major roles in the revival of the dispute: (1) 
the DSU and its contribution of a more rigorous DSM;138 and (2) the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).139 
 A revised version of the GATT Subsidies Code, the ASCM defines a 
subsidy as “a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body” where “a benefit is . . . conferred.”140 The Agreement only ap-
plies to subsidies “specific to an enterprise or industry,” which are 
deemed either “prohibited” or “actionable.”141 The Agreement also 
determines when and to what extent states may enact countervailing 
measures to combat a subsidy’s adverse effects—if a member state finds 
that another member state subsidizes exports that injure its domestic 
industry, and there is a causal link between the two, then the WTO will 
allow countervailing measures.142 
                                                                                                                     
 Following Airbus’s launch of the A380 and its capture of a majority 
market share in the early 2000s,143 Boeing and the U.S. government 
intensified their criticism of the EU and Airbus, with the United States 
ultimately withdrawing from the 1992 Bilateral Agreement in October 
2004.144 Mandatory consultations followed; upon their failure in May 
 
 
134 Id. art. 8.12. 
135 Id. art. 13.3; Thornton, supra note 89, at 147. 
136 See Spradlin, supra note 114, at 1208–09 (“[The Bilateral Agreement] provided a so-
lution . . . . [though] many problems still exist.”). 
137 Cf. id. at 1216–18 (discussing why member states did not address LCA during the 
Uruguay Round). 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 57–79. 
139 See Stoler, supra note 109, at 805. 
140 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
410 [hereinafter ASCM]. 
141 Id. arts. 2, 3, 5. 
142 Id. art. 19. 
143 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
144 Gary G. Yerkey & Joe Kirwin, U.S., EU Bicker over U.S. Decision to Pull Out of Bilateral 
Aircraft Agreement, 21 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1674 (Oct. 14, 2004); see America Flies to War; 
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2005, the United States requested the formation of a panel,145 with the 
EU launching its own complaint on the same day.146 The filings were 
immediately complicated by both parties’ requests for additional panels 
concerning concurrent developments,147 leading the DSB to create a 
panel for each complaint—DS316 for the U.S. complaint, the “Airbus 
case,” and DS353 for the EU complaint, the “Boeing case.”148 Commen-
tators labeled the collective case the “toughest” in the WTO’s history.149 
 The DS316 Panel report, made public in June 2010, entails mixed 
findings, holding that the United States both established and failed to 
establish certain claims from its filing.150 Both sides claimed victory fol-
                                                                                                                      
Airbus and Boeing, Economist, Oct. 7, 2004, at 61–62. The A380, explicitly aimed at super-
seding the Boeing 747 as the world’s largest passenger aircraft, was the first new Airbus 
product following the 1992 Bilateral Agreement. See Pavcnik, supra note 11, at 742–43. EU 
subsidies for the A380 complied with the 1992 Bilateral Agreement (the launch aid, to be 
repaid at an interest rate of one-quarter percent within seventeen years, did not exceed 
thirty-three percent of development costs). Id. at 743–44. But the United States contended 
that the EU violated the ASCM (because the subsidies were targeted and did not account 
for the aircraft’s commercial risk), which the United States further alleged takes prece-
dence over the 1992 Treaty. Id. 
145 U.S. DSM Filing, supra note 15, at 1. The filing challenged European (1) launch 
aid/multi-state funding (LA/MSF); (2) loans; (3) infrastructure development; (4) debt 
forgiveness; (5) equity infusions; (6) R&D funding; and (7) all other measures related to 
the development and sale of the entire Airbus family of aircraft. Id. at 1–4. 
146 EU DSM Filing, supra note 16, at 1. This filing challenged (1) state and local tax in-
centives; (2) NASA R&D subsidies; (3) NASA informational spillovers; (4) DOD subsidies; (5) 
Department of Commerce informational spillovers; (6) NASA and DOD intellectual property 
right waivers; (7) Department of Labor informational spillovers; (8) NASA and DOD con-
tracts; (9) Boeing’s use of NASA and DOD facilities; and (10) federal tax incentives. Id. at 2–
10. 
147 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—Measures Af-
fecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft add., WT/DS316/1/Add.1 (Feb. 7, 2006); Daniel Pruzin, 
WTO Panel Sets New Timetable for Review of U.S. Complaint Against Airbus Subsidies, 23 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1562 (Feb. 11, 2006). 
148 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Delays Release of Interim Decision on Boeing Subsidies Until Mid-
September, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1076 ( July 15, 2010). 
149 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 242. As one WTO Official put it, the case entailed 
“time-consuming” discovery and litigation that was “unprecedented” in its intensity. Inter-
view with anonymous WTO Secretariat Official, in Geneva, Switz. (Nov. 18, 2010). 
150 See DS316 Panel Report, supra note 21, ¶¶ 8.1–.8. For example, it ruled that all 
LA/MSF constituted subsidies under the ASCM, but that only A380 subsidies from Ger-
many, Spain, and the UK (not France) were export-contingent, and thus prohibited. Id. 
¶¶ 8.1(a)(ii), 8.3(a)(ii). The Panel made similar distinctions for other allegations, such as 
infrastructure and R&D subsidies. See id. ¶¶ 8.1–.8. The AB later altered these findings. 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶ 1414–1415, WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
DS316 AB Report]. 
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lowing the Panel’s split finding151 and filed subsequent appeals.152 The 
AB handed down its report in May 2011, in which it upheld several of 
the Panel’s findings, but reversed others on the basis of procedural dis-
agreements.153 Following the report’s adoption by the DSB and a stan-
dard six-month implementation period, the EU claimed that it satisfied 
its requirements in December 2011.154 The United States contested the 
EU’s implementation claim, requesting further consultations and the 
ability to impose up to $10 billion in sanctions.155 Following EU pro-
tests over the amount and methodology of the requested sanctions, the 
WTO commenced arbitration between the two sides.156 
 The DS353 Panel report, made public in March 2011, validated 
some EU complaints; it found U.S. subsidies to be illicit,157 and gener-
                                                                                                                      
 
151 See Daniel Pruzin, Boeing Disputes Significance of EU Win at WTO in Challenge to Air-
craft Subsidies, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1436 (Sept. 23, 2010). The Panel concluded that 
Airbus received illegal subsidies including $15 billion in below-market-rate loans, $2.2 bil-
lion in equity infusions, $1.7 billion in infrastructure, and $1.5 billion in R&D subsidies. Id. 
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk called the ruling an “important victory [that would] 
. . . level the competitive playing field.” Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Ruling Slams Illegal Subsi-
dies for Europe’s Airbus in Case Brought by U.S., 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1029 ( July 8, 
2010). EU officials quickly contested the outcome as limited, noting that the United States 
had alleged $205 billion of subsidies, and that the actual outcome was “worlds away” from 
that figure; likewise, Airbus noted how “[seventy] percent of the U.S. claims were rejected 
and wild allegations have been proven wrong.” Id. 
152 Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States Under Article 16.4 and Article 
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU), and Under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, European Commu-
nities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/13 
(Aug. 20, 2010); Notification of an Appeal by the European Union Under Article 16.4 and 
Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes (DSU), and Under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, EC and Cer-
tain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/12 ( July 23, 
2010). 
153 DS316 AB Report, supra note 150, ¶¶ 1414–1415. The AB “overturned the panel’s 
finding that [A380] launch aid provided by Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom . . . 
constituted prohibited subsidies . . . . [It] concluded that the interpretation of WTO rules 
used by the panel . . . was incorrect . . . [and] it did not have enough factual evidence on 
hand to issue its own findings.” Daniel Pruzin & Len Bracken, EU Scores Gains in Airbus 
Subsidies Ruling by World Trade Organization Appellate Body, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 819 
(May 19, 2011). 
154 Len Bracken, U.S. Requests WTO Consultations With EU On Compliance With Airbus 
Subsidy Ruling, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2014 (Dec. 15, 2011). 
155 Id. 
156 See Tom Miles, WTO to Arbitrate on U.S. Sanctions in Airbus Case, Reuters, Dec. 22, 
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/wto-airbus-idUSL6E7NM1L5 
20111222. 
157 DS353 Panel Report, supra note 22, ¶¶ 8.1–.6. The Panel highlighted that some 
state tax incentives and federal R&D support constituted illicit subsidies, and it “exercised 
2012] The WTO DSM, Negotiation, and the U.S./EU Aircraft Dispute 273 
ated both declarations of victory158 and appeals by both sides.159 Yet 
beyond the DSM and LCA industry’s history, exploration of 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement’s negotiation-oriented provisions is 
necessary in order to understand the likelihood of a negotiated settle-
ment to this dispute. 
                                                                                                                     
II. Discussion 
 GATT/WTO dispute settlement encourages states to negotiate so-
lutions, rather than automatically to comply with panel or AB deci-
sions.160 This encouragement results from several factors, which can be 
categorized into two classes: (1) textual and intrinsic negotiation effects, 
which result from explicit provisions found within GATT/WTO treaties; 
161 and (2) empirical and theoretical support for these effects, which 
result from state behavior under the GATT/WTO system.162 
 The first class of factors includes the development of the GATT/ 
WTO system as one that emphasizes state autonomy, mutual agreement, 
and amicability,163 as well as the parties’ definition of success and the 
aim of dispute resolution in the international trade law system.164 The 
 
judicial economy” regarding the actual monetary value of the policies’ adverse effects. See 
id. ¶¶ 8.1–.10. 
158 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Publishes Final Ruling in Complaint Against Boeing Subsidies; 
EU, U.S. Claim Win, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 564 (Apr. 7, 2011). EU representatives 
contended that the DS353 Panel “clearly confirmed” its “main claims” by finding subsidies 
of “at least $5.3 billion” in value; U.S. officials, claiming that they had “prevailed,” pointed 
to the Panel’s request that the U.S. government “remove . . . only $2.7 billion” worth of 
subsidies, “a fraction of the $23.7 billion the [EU] had originally claimed.” Id. 
159 Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States Under Article 16.4 and Article 
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU), and Under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United 
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 
29, 2011); Notification of an Appeal by the European Union Under Article 16.4 and Article 
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU), and Under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United 
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/8 (Apr. 4, 
2011). 
160 See DSU, supra note 57, art. 3.7; GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXII. 
161 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
162 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
163 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX:1, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. The WTO aims to “con-
tinue the . . . consensus followed under the GATT” but allows for decisions by majority 
vote where consensus is not possible. Id. 
164 See infra text accompanying notes 180–183. 
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second class of factors lies within the results of the DSM’s track re-
cord.165 
A. Textual and Intrinsic Negotiation Effects 
 Although the GATT’s dispute resolution provisions are relatively 
meager and few compared to the DSM,166 they illustrate its sovereignty-
centered attitudes towards settlement.167 This emphasis on sovereignty, 
however, generated a lack of enforcement mechanisms,168 and negotia-
tion became essential to harmonized trade.169 Articles XXII and XXIII 
thus placed a strong emphasis on “sympathetic consideration;” such will-
ingness to negotiate ultimately underpinned the GATT.170 States valued 
a framework that allowed them to determine outcomes rather than cede 
this responsibility to an external body.171 
 Corollary agreements further supported the GATT’s negotiation 
effects: during the 1979 Tokyo Round, the GATT Contracting Parties 
issued an “Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dis-
pute Settlement and Surveillance” (Understanding), which clarified and 
partially codified the procedures that the GATT 1947 had left un-
clear.172 The Understanding notes that use of GATT dispute settlement 
is not a “contentious act[]” and requires parties’ “good faith . . . effort[s] 
to resolve the disputes.”173 Other Tokyo Round treaties echo Article 
XXII and XXIII’s emphasis on negotiation.174 In short, relevant provi-
                                                                                                                      
 
165 See Harrington, supra note 27, at 323 (discussing DSM empirical patterns that dem-
onstrate a high settlement rate). 
166 Compare GATT 1947, supra note 41, arts. XXII–XXIII (outlining dispute settlement 
procedures in two out of thirty-four articles), with DSU, supra note 57, arts. 1–27 (devoting 
an entirely separate treaty to dispute settlement). 
167 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organiza-
tion and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 Common Mkt. L. 
Rev. 1157, 1158–59 (1994). 
168 See Davey, supra note 49, at 81, 85–88. Such a lack of enforcement ability was a pri-
mary motivating factor in creating a new DSM. See McLarty, supra note 59, at 263–66. 
169 Robert Alilovic, Consultations Under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System, 9 Dalhousie 
J. Legal Stud. 279, 282 (2000). 
170 GATT 1947, supra note 41, arts. XXII, XXIII; see Petersmann, supra note 39, at 33. 
171 See Gary N. Horlick, The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private Practi-
tioner’s View, 32 Int’l Law. 685, 686 (1998). 
172 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Sur-
veillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210–11 [hereinafter Tokyo Round 
Understanding]; Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 19. 
173 Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 172, at 211–12. 
174 See Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 52, arts. 8.5, 8.6 (“Each signatory shall af-
ford sympathetic consideration to and adequate opportunity for prompt consultation . . . 
to seek a mutually acceptable solution prior to the initiation of an investigation . . . .”); 
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sions in the GATT, policy statements by the institution, and subsequent 
treaties clarify that consultation and negotiation are both precursors to 
litigation as well as a preferred form of resolution.175 
                                                                                                                     
 Even after legalization under the DSU, this spirit of negotiation as a 
first order preference persists.176 This persistence leads some to con-
clude that disputes are merely events that occur between rounds of in-
terstate negotiation, and that the DSM is intentionally built to create 
multiple negotiation opportunities at every procedural level.177 The 
DSU itself highlights such potential opportunities: Article 4, for exam-
ple, codifies and reinforces Article XXII and XXIII’s emphasis on con-
sultation, implying that settlement is preferable before further litiga-
tion.178 Article 3.7 cautions states to exercise judgment with respect to 
disputes that would be unlikely to succeed, thus warning them of the 
gravity of enacting a DSM complaint and stating that it is in their best 
interest to resolve disputes bilaterally.179 
 The DSU does not explicitly define success, but the system’s effi-
cacy hinges on such a definition, both in the aircraft dispute and in 
other cases.180 Some suggest that the DSM is only successful when it re-
 
 
Subsidies Code, supra note 52, art. 18.6, 18.8 (mandating panels to issue the descriptive 
parts of their reports first in order “[t]o encourage development of mutually satisfactory 
solutions”; if the parties fail to develop such a solution, only then can the panel submit its 
full written report). 
175 See Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 172, at 211; Civil Aircraft Agreement, 
supra note 52, arts. 8.5, 8.6; Subsidies Code, supra note 52, arts. 18.6, 18.8; GATT 1947, 
supra note 41, arts. XXII–XXIII. 
176 See Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 Ohio 
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 141, 147 (2003). 
177 Id. By mandating initial negotiation, the DSU provides time lapses during which 
parties can both negotiate and develop alternative methods of dispute resolution. See Joost 
Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: “Americanization” and Negotiation in the Settlement of WTO 
Disputes, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 121, 133–39 (2003). 
178 Compare DSU, supra note 57, art. 4.1 (“Members affirm their resolve to strengthen 
and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures employed by Members.”), 
with GATT 1947, supra note 41, arts. XXII–XXIII (“Each contracting party shall accord 
sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation . . . . 
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties . . . the matter may 
be referred to [a panel].”). 
179 See DSU, supra note 57, art. 3.7. The Article warns states to “exercise . . . judgment 
as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the [DSM] is to 
secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties . . . and consistent 
with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solu-
tion, the first objective of the [DSM] is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with . . . the covered agreements.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
180 Cf. id. (implying that, in its preference for “a solution mutually acceptable to the 
parties” over mandated withdrawal, the DSU does not foresee a single result to any given 
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sults in compliance with international law at all costs.181 Others argue 
that, given the nature of international relations, this is too ambitious.182 
They contend that as long as the DSM can effectively push disputing 
states to resolve their issues, it has succeeded.183 Consultation and nego-
tiation is a direct way to accomplish this goal;184 only when it fails, and a 
mutually agreed-upon solution has proven elusive, can the WTO use its 
enforcement power to bring states into conformity with its laws.185 The 
DSU also promotes further consultation, creating negotiation opportu-
nities after the panel process has started.186 
 The textual provisions of the DSU that can promote settlement are 
not limited to those concerning the disputing parties: Article 10 pro-
motes settlement by allowing countries with “a substantial interest in a 
matter before [the DSB]” to make oral and written submissions during 
panel proceedings.187 GATT Article XXIII also permits disputing par-
ties to invite other countries into the consultation process.188 These 
provisions enable the disputing parties to broaden their disagreement 
beyond their immediate issues, creating incentive to find a solution that 
will be agreeable to all parties, not just disputing ones.189 
                                                                                                                      
dispute, and states, thus playing an active role in determining such outcomes, can lay out 
their goals for success). Such flexibility has enabled parties to create heterogeneous reso-
lutions to large and complex disputes, utilizing panel and/or AB reports alongside their 
own negotiated terms. See infra, text accompanying notes 231–245. 
181 See, e.g., Andrea K. Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of (International) Law: What 
the Normalization of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolu-
tion, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 789, 797 (2009) (pointing to the WTO’s relatively strong 
enforcement power and oversight of states’ gradual relinquishment of sovereignty). 
182 See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 33, at 29–30 (discussing the WTO’s institutional de-
velopment and legalization, and implying that member states still operate in the interna-
tional system, where they value their sovereignty and structure their behavior around it). 
183 Interview with anonymous WTO Secretariat Official, in Geneva, Switz. (Nov. 19, 
2010). 
184 Cf. Harrington, supra note 27, at 323 (arguing that the strength of the DSM lies in 
its deterrent effect, which leads states to negotiate). Given the language of Article 3.7 and 
the overall history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement, the organization has indicated that 
the DSM’s success depends on mutually agreed-upon solutions. See DSU, supra note 57, art. 
3.7. Thus, while the WTO seeks to enforce its regulations and remove illegal national poli-
cies, this goal is secondary to ensuring states’ satisfaction with the resolution of trade dis-
putes. See id. 
185 See DSU, supra note 57, arts. 21, 22. 
186 Id. arts. 5.5, 5.6 (noting that parties can renew or continue negotiation at any point 
during the panel process, and that the DSU itself is meant to promote equivalent consulta-
tion provisions in other WTO agreements). 
187 Id. art 10.2. 
188 GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXIII. 
189 See William J. Davey & Amelia Porges, Comments, Performance of the System I: Consul-
tations & Deterrence, 32 Int’l Law. 695, 701 (1998). 
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 Finally, consultation is not the DSU’s only form of alternative dis-
pute resolution: Article 5 allows for conciliation and mediation,190 and 
Article 25 enables the parties to elect arbitration.191 With binding panel 
and AB decisions, however, stakes under the DSM are higher than un-
der the GATT, providing incentives for states to settle their disputes.192 
B. Theoretical and Empirical Support for Negotiation Effects 
 Along with the text of the GATT and the DSU, empirical and theo-
retical factors also push states towards negotiation. These factors in-
clude: (1) states’ level of development and experience with the DSM;193 
(2) the role of informational availability;194 and (3) the binding nature 
of compliance measures.195 
1. States’ Level of Development and Experience with the DSM 
 A positive correlation exists between the frequency with which 
states file DSM cases, their level of economic development, and the 
prospects for settlement.196 The higher a state’s level of economic de-
velopment, the more resources it has to litigate within and gain experi-
ence under the DSM.197 This experience enables such a state to identify 
settlement junctures and opportunities, thus making it more likely to 
settle.198 
 During the first ten years of the WTO’s history, 45 percent of cases 
went on to litigation, while the remaining 55 percent were settled or 
resolved outside the DSM.199 During this same period, the United States 
and the EU were the two most frequent participants in the DSM sys-
tem.200 Political and economic characteristics may explain this behav-
ior—because developed states have the resources to file numerous 
                                                                                                                      
190 DSU, supra note 57, art. 5. 
191 Id. art. 25. The introduction of new and alternative forms of non-litigious dispute 
resolution, despite the formalization of litigation under the WTO, demonstrates that the 
WTO’s emphasis on amicable resolution is equal to, if not greater than, the GATT’s. See 
Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 137–40. 
192 See Horlick, supra note 171, at 687. 
193 See infra text accompanying notes 196–206. 
194 See infra text accompanying notes 207–221. 
195 See infra text accompanying notes 222–252. 
196 See Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation 
at the World Trade Organization, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 625, 639–40, 648–52 (2010). 
197 See id. at 639–40. 
198 See id. at 648–52. 
199 See id. at 637. 
200 Id. at 631. 
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claims, they resort to the DSM most frequently, leading to greater ex-
perience with the process, which they can draw upon when dealing with 
less-experienced adversaries.201 
 The nature of precedent within the WTO reinforces the impor-
tance of repeat interaction.202 Despite a lack of binding precedent, 
WTO legal institutions frequently rely upon previous decisions, leading 
many to conclude that the WTO utilizes a form of “de facto stare de-
cisis.”203 This jurisprudence enables experienced DSM actors to empha-
size rules compliance, the effect of their disputes on macro-legal devel-
opments at the WTO, and greater concern for the effects of litigation 
on their reputations.204 Experienced actors’ filings are thus more stra-
tegic and focused on long-term gains, which are more likely to arise out 
of negotiation and settlement.205 Less-developed and less-experienced 
DSM litigants are not as strategic, concentrating more on litigation and 
tangible returns.206 
2. Informational Availability 
 Institutionalist political scientists argue that international organiza-
tions like the WTO make conflict less likely by increasing the availability 
of information.207 States must frequently make policy decisions under 
                                                                                                                      
201 Id. at 629. 
202 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 163, art. IX:2. The WTO General Council and 
Ministerial Conference have ultimate authority to definitively interpret the treaties; panel 
and AB interpretations do not constitute binding precedent. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 
247, 254 (2004). 
203 Steinberg, supra note 202, at 254. 
204 See Conti, supra note 196, at 655–57. This focus on reputation results from the abil-
ity to participate in, and in turn build experience with, the DSM. See id. at 655–56. 
205 See id. at 629. Because negotiation and consultation enable states to dictate their 
own terms, experienced states can better ensure long-term resolutions in their interest. See 
id. at 656–58 (“Repeat players are able to anticipate the implications of a ruling and act to 
secure changes to case law that they favor.”). 
206 Id. at 629. The author of this Note does not mean to suggest that developed coun-
tries are superior to developing ones. Nevertheless, some commentators note that develop-
ing countries feel marginalized within the GATT/WTO system. See, e.g., Hansel T. Pham, 
Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the DSU, 9 Harv. Negot. L. 
Rev. 331, 335 (2004). The WTO has addressed this concern through measures such as the 
Advisory Centre (a legal aid bureau for developing states) and lenient DSU provisions for 
developing states. See id. at 348. Yet repeat litigants, largely consisting of developed states, 
are more likely to settle. See Conti, supra note 196, at 629. 
207 See Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions, 52 Int’l Org. 729, 740 (1998). 
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imperfect conditions, generating less optimal outcomes.208 By improv-
ing information sharing, institutions lead states to make decisions that 
are more attuned to one another’s concerns and, thus, to cooperate.209 
The DSM consultation requirement enables it to encourage states to 
reveal information.210 Yet because information asymmetries are most 
likely to exist before discovery and the panel process, and each side is 
optimistic that it can win, early settlement is usually unlikely.211 
 Because the WTO gives panels a broad mandate to serve as triers 
of fact and interpret legal rules,212 the odds of information sharing in-
crease substantially once parties initiate the panel process.213 Junctures 
before, during, and after panel proceedings provide opportunities to 
make information available and for parties to suspend proceedings in 
order to renew negotiations.214 
 States utilize these junctures: during the WTO’s first five years, fifty-
two percent of cases resulted in the establishment of a panel, but only 
thirty-five percent resulted in a panel ruling.215 Thus, in almost twenty 
percent of cases, a panel was established but the parties settled the dis-
pute themselves.216 Moreover, this figure does not include cases where 
parties settled after a panel ruling.217 Even the AB, the last source of 
rule interpretation before states must implement findings, has been 
called an effective “starting point” for further talks or arbitration.218 
                                                                                                                      
 
208 See id. at 744–45 (utilizing the Prisoners’ Dilemma model to exemplify this chal-
lenge and illustrate international relations’ anarchic nature). 
209 See id. at 742. 
210 Horlick, supra note 171, at 692. Textual provisions in the DSU, such as sympathetic 
consideration and confidentiality, encourage disclosure and thus increase informational 
availability. See DSU, supra note 57, arts. 4.2, 4.6. 
211 Porges, supra note 176, at 174. Similar conditions exist in domestic litigation; how-
ever, because WTO laws and obligations are continuously developing, such information 
may not be as easily available at the outset of a DSM dispute. See id. at 147. 
212 DSU, supra note 57, art. 11; Gavin Goh & David Morgan, Political Considerations and 
Pragmatic Outcomes in WTO Dispute Rulings, 30 U. New S. Wales L.J. 477, 496 (2007). 
213Cf. Porges, supra note 176, at 147 (noting that panels adjudicate between two nego-
tiations—a failed and a successful one, respectively—thus increasing the likelihood for 
shared information and settlement upon initiation of panel proceedings). 
214 See Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 133–37 (providing an outline of settlement oppor-
tunities before, during, and after panel proceedings). For example, the interim review 
period is ideal for settlement, as the panel has reached all of its factual and legal conclu-
sions; this generates maximum information that is balanced by the protection of confiden-
tiality. See id. at 135–36. 
215 Porges, supra note 176, at 142. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 Harrington, supra note 27, at 339. Because the AB may reinterpret WTO rules, it 
can provide an opportunity for parties to negotiate along re-characterized legal norms that 
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 Of the 427 cases filed to date, 138 remain in consultation; in 88, 
states either settled or withdrew at some point during the dispute proc-
ess.219 Thus, over fifty percent of cases have either yet to produce a de-
cision or have been settled.220 Commentators suggest that such a rate is 
largely due to the increase of information following the initiation of 
panel proceedings.221 
3. States’ Reactions to the Binding Nature of DSM Ramifications 
 Because states must implement DSB recommendations, negotia-
tion offers an opportunity for states to settle on their own terms and 
avoid expensive and protracted litigation.222 This binding nature sets 
the DSM apart from GATT dispute settlement.223 
 When consultations fail and the DSB issues a report, the DSM’s 
central focus becomes compliance with WTO law.224 Compliance pri-
marily occurs through the offending state’s mandated withdrawal or 
alteration of the violative policy.225 If the state fails do so, the WTO can 
authorize the complaining state’s use of retaliatory measures.226 The 
DSB has rarely authorized retaliation, which causes economic harm, 
discord in the global trading system, and damage to states’ reputa-
                                                                                                                      
may differ from the panel’s decision, generating a new negotiation environment. See Conti, 
supra note 196, at 656–57. 
219 Current Status of Disputes, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ 
e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
220 See id. 
221 See Porges, supra note 176, at 172–176 (discussing the influence of information re-
vealed through the panel process on the likelihood of settlement). 
222 See Alilovic, supra note 169, at 298–99 (“[T]he automatic adoption of a potentially 
harsh report which must be complied with in a set period of time is a powerful incentive to 
resolve a dispute in a more conciliatory manner.”). 
223 Compare DSU, supra note 57, art. 22.2 (“[T]he DSB [may] suspend the application 
to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations of the covered agree-
ments.”), and Horlick, supra note 171, at 687 (“The key factor in WTO consultations is the 
binding nature of the [DSM].”), with sources cited supra notes 53–55 (highlighting non-
compliance as a problem with GATT dispute settlement). 
224 DSU, supra note 57, art. 12.7 (“Where the parties . . . have failed to develop a mutu-
ally satisfactory solution . . . the report of a panel shall set out the findings of fact, the ap-
plicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and recommen-
dations that it makes.”) (emphasis added); Patricio Grané, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 755, 761–62 (2001). 
225 See DSU, supra note 57, art. 22.2. 
226Id. arts. 22.2–.3; Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Re-
taliation in the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 Theoretical In-
quiries L. 215, 228 (2005). 
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tions.227 Consultation enables states to avoid these problems alto-
gether.228 Yet even if initial negotiations fail, the DSU’s “reasonable pe-
riod of time” for implementation enables “losers” to find common 
ground with “winners” and create an outcome in which compliance 
occurs in a mutually agreeable fashion, providing autonomy in the im-
plementation of DSB recommendations.229 
 Such autonomy may weaken the DSM.230 Yet because the DSM’s 
primary function is to lead states to mutually agreeable outcomes, this 
autonomy strengthens the DSM’s ability to accomplish its main goal.231 
The dispute in European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale, and 
Distribution of Bananas exemplifies this debate.232 Bananas centered on 
the EU’s more favorable treatment of its former colonies in the global 
banana trade and entailed multiple panels and appeals.233 Although the 
DSB issued guidelines, the parties never implemented its rulings.234 
 Many cited Bananas as evidence that some cases, due to their com-
plexity and political contentiousness, can neutralize the DSM’s binding 
nature.235 Yet the disputing parties ultimately used the AB’s findings as 
a basis for their own agreement, which combined various DSB recom-
mendations.236 Thus, despite not strictly following the AB report, the 
parties still complied with it by structuring a negotiated outcome and 
eventual resolution per its recommendations.237 
                                                                                                                      
 
227 See Conti, supra note 196, at 655; William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 42 Cornell Int’l L.J. 119, 124–25 (2009); Nzelibe, supra note 226, at 228–29. 
228 See Alilovic, supra note 169, at 298–99. 
229 See DSU, supra note 57, art. 21.3(b). The ability to negotiate thus persists after the 
decision, though parties are constrained by the panel ruling. See Pauwelyn, supra note 177, 
at 136. 
230 See Ryan E. Lee, Comment, Dogfight: Criticizing the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures Amidst the Largest Dispute in World Trade Organization History, 32 N.C. J. Int’l 
L. & Com. Reg. 115, 153 (2006). 
231 See Jackson, supra note 19, at 204. 
232 See Len Bracken, U.S., EU Agree to Settle Dispute over Latin American Bananas, USTR 
Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 ( June 10, 2010). 
233 Lee, supra note 230, at 143–44. 
234 See Porges, supra note 176, at 146. 
235 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 230, at 145 (“[T]he Banana Wars have haunted the WTO 
for most of its history.”); see also Douglas Ierley, Defining the Factors that Influence Developing 
Country Compliance with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at 
the Dispute over Bananas, 33 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 615, 626 (2002) (noting that Bananas 
changed the “ambiance” in the DSM, reflecting a “loss of confidence” and “put[ting] the 
DSU in doubt”). 
236 See Porges, supra note 176, at 146. 
237 See id. (“[T]he outputs in WTO disputes almost always permit more than one possi-
ble compliance outcome[.] . . . [In Bananas,] the panel recognized there were multiple 
compliance paths possible and picked one as a reasonable benchmark for comparison. . . . 
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 Frequently, critics of the DSM’s ability to bind states also cite a se-
ries of cases filed by Brazil and Canada regarding export credit financ-
ing of small regional aircraft (collectively “Brazil/Canada–Aircraft”).238 
After years of hearings and appeals, the WTO authorized both sides to 
retaliate.239 Rather than retaliating, however, the two addressed many 
of their outstanding issues through a 2007 Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) agreement.240 
d.245 
                                                                                                                     
 Those who contend that the DSM’s strength comes from its ability 
to bind states to outcomes did not find much comfort in Brazil/Canada–
Aircraft.241 Yet these are but two of the hundreds of DSM cases that have 
generated compliance.242 Moreover, in Brazil/Canada–Aircraft, retalia-
tion would have sparked a trade war.243 This became clear when Brazil 
and Canada faced the choice of either complying with the DSB’s ruling 
or an extrinsic negotiated resolution.244 Were the DSB’s measures not 
binding, the parties may not have had an incentive to negotiate an out-
come instea
 The above cases demonstrate that the binding force of DSB deci-
sions works even when it may seem otherwise: it can (1) push states into 
negotiation and in turn, resolution;246 (2) provide a foundation, as in 
Bananas, upon which states create and enact their own compliance 
measures;247 or (3) as in Brazil/Canada–Aircraft, cause states to recog-
 
[The parties] arrived at . . . a solution that was hybrid, heterodox, and determined by ne-
gotiation.”). 
238 See Helena D. Sullivan, Regional Jet Trade Wars: Politics and Compliance in WTO Dispute 
Resolution, 12 Minn. J. Global Trade 71, 71–72 (2003). The Brazil/Canada–Aircraft cases 
are frequently cited as important with regard to the Boeing-Airbus dispute, given the simi-
lar products and use of subsidies. See Lee, supra note 230, at 146. 
239 See Lawrence J. Speer, Brazil Joins Updated OECD Pact on Export Credits for Civil Avia-
tion, 24 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1107 (Aug. 2, 2007). 
240 Id. 
241 See, e.g., Ivan Krmpotic, Brazil–Aircraft: Qualitative and Temporal Aspects of “With-
drawal” Under SCM Article 4.7, 33 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 653, 673 (2002) (“The decision 
in Brazil–Aircraft is more akin to GATT-era decisions whose deference to national policies 
[reflects] an anarchic international system devoid of coercive power” and “amounts to a 
step backwards in WTO jurisprudence.”). 
242 See Current Status of Disputes, supra note 219. 
243 See Lee, supra note 230, at 148. 
244 See Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement 
Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 397, 403 (2007). 
245 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Gives Brazil Green Light to Impose Sanctions in Canadian Air-
craft Dispute, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 564 (Mar. 27, 2003) (noting that, when faced with 
the DSB’s permission to retaliate, representatives from Canada and Brazil vowed to inten-
sify efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution and avoid sanctions). 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 224–229. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 232–237. 
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nize the perils of retaliation in order to produce a more effective out-
come.248 
 Finally, the WTO’s ability to bind states relates to a broader issue: 
the political sensitivity of panels and the AB, and the latter’s judicial 
restraint.249 This reflects the notion that, as an influential international 
organization, the WTO—and by extension, the DSB—does not operate 
in a vacuum.250 Rather, panelists and AB members are acutely aware of 
the broader ramifications of their decisions, structuring their legal rea-
soning and jurisprudence so as to not agitate international economic 
relations.251 
 In other words, the system, while legalized, accounts for the nature 
of international diplomacy, continuing developments, and the impor-
tance of avoiding unrealistic expectations.252 In light of the LCA dis-
pute’s history and the above structural mechanisms, the likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement becomes apparent. 
III. Analysis 
 Under the right circumstances, GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
leads parties to settle their disputes rather than seek a mandated solu-
tion through litigation.253 Such effects are evident in the transatlantic 
aircraft dispute in the era leading up to the 1992 Bilateral Agreement,254 
as well as in the contemporary litigation.255 
A. The Era Leading up to the 1992 Bilateral Agreement 
 The GATT/WTO system’s ability to generate a negotiated settle-
ment to the transatlantic aircraft conflict is evident in the dispute’s re-
cent history.256 In the years prior to the 1992 Bilateral Agreement, the 
United States and the EEC went through two stages before resorting to 
                                                                                                                      
248 See supra text accompanying notes 240–245. 
249 See Goh & Morgan, supra note 212, at 482–84; Steinberg, supra note 202, at 263–67. 
250 See Steinberg, supra note 202, at 263–67. Some point to the DSM’s political aware-
ness as the reason for its success and the WTO’s influence. See id. The DSM possesses and 
utilizes “the most effective dispute resolution procedures” in the international legal system. 
Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 303, 321 (2004). 
251 See Steinberg, supra note 202, at 257. 
252 See Goh & Morgan, supra note 212, at 480–82 (discussing how the WTO deals with 
extant circumstances by involving civil society, selecting language carefully, avoiding con-
tentious findings, and coordinating timing with other international political events). 
253 See discussion supra Part II. 
254 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
255 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
256 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
284 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:253 
GATT dispute settlement: (1) talks in the GATT Civil Aircraft Commit-
tee, and (2) bilateral negotiation.257 The former failed due to weak 
treaty provisions and enforcement,258 and the latter broke down due to 
the parties’ inability to agree on common terms, definitions, and guide-
lines.259 
 The U.S. strategy of investigating Airbus subsidies260 and request-
ing Article XXII consultations regarding EEC Subsidies Code violations 
enabled the United States to legitimize its viewpoint that the Europeans 
were not serious about resolving the aircraft dispute.261 By contesting 
only the merger/debt forgiveness issue, the United States attained an 
efficient GATT ruling that provided a legal definition of the debt pro-
gram as an illicit subsidy.262 This gave the United States some needed 
international support to force the EEC to negotiate in earnest.263 In 
turn, it accomplished the stated goal of GATT dispute settlement to 
find a mutually agreeable solution by providing information and estab-
lishing norms.264 Moreover, the decision provided a starting point for a 
wider case against all Airbus subsidies, further catalyzing the EEC to 
move toward a bilateral resolution.265 
                                                                                                                      
257 See supra text accompanying notes 120–129. 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 114–119, 122. 
259 See generally Steven McGuire, Airbus Industrie: Conflict and Cooperation in 
US-EC Trade Relations 144–54 (1997) (highlighting the progress and challenges of U.S.-
EEC negotiations in the late 1980s). 
260 See Thornton, supra note 89, at 138. Following the failure of bilateral talks, the 
U.S. government hired Gellman Research Associates (GRA) to conduct a private investiga-
tion of Airbus’s subsidization. See id. GRA’s report, released in 1990, was widely seen as a 
calculated effort to pressure the Europeans into negotiations and ultimate concessions. See 
id. at 138–41. 
261 See Competitiveness of U.S. Commercial Aircraft Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th 
Cong. 25 (1987) (statement of Michael B. Smith, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.). The United 
States saw the EEC as a flippant and intransigent negotiating partner; it thus needed a 
foundation for its allegations, so that the Europeans would “understand [its] seriousness 
and depth of concern.” Id. The United States thus pursued a two-pronged approach by 
seeking domestic political backing through the GRA Report and concurrent international 
legal support through a favorable GATT ruling. Thornton, supra note 89, at 136. 
262 See Report by the Panel, German Exchange Rate Scheme for Deutsche Airbus, ¶ 6.1, 
SCM/142 (Mar. 4, 1992) (unadopted); see also Thornton, supra note 89, at 137–38 (noting 
that the time between the complaint and the ultimate panel report was less than a year). 
“Contrary to the [European] position . . . the [Subsidies] Committee agreed with the United 
States that the Subsidies Code was the proper forum for the U.S. dispute. . . . We cannot 
forego our legal rights under the Subsidies Code.” Comm. on Subsidies & Countervailing 
Measures, Communication from the United States 1–2, SCM/125 (Sept. 18, 1991). 
263 See McGuire, supra note 259, at 154–55. 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 39–44. 
265 See McGuire, supra note 259, at 154–55. 
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 At the time, however, feelings about GATT dispute settlement were 
mixed.266 Some policymakers expressed concern that U.S. efforts 
would bear little fruit, due to the GATT’s weak enforcement and failure 
to bind states, or worse, a possible loss.267 Yet the involved actors be-
lieved in the GATT’s legitimacy, encouraging the EEC to take the debt 
case panel’s finding seriously.268 
                                                                                                                     
 In sum, GATT dispute settlement during the pre-1992 era brought 
about a negotiated solution in several ways:269 (1) the Article XXII 
guidelines encouraged negotiation;270 (2) the information-provision 
function legitimized U.S. allegations, forcing the EEC to treat them se-
riously; 271 and (3) the threat of a wider GATT case, which, even if it 
were to remain unadopted (like the debt case), would further legiti-
mize U.S. views and weaken the Europeans.272 
 Following negotiation of the Bilateral Agreement, the United 
States suspended its wider case against the EEC and Airbus, but did not 
withdraw it.273 Only after all outstanding GATT cases were terminated 
as part of the transition to the WTO did the case cease to exist, al-
though its claims were resurrected a decade later.274 Yet just as GATT 
dispute settlement deterred the litigation of a wider case in the 1990s, it 
can now, through the updated DSM, prevent the negative ramifications 
of such litigation. 
 
266 See Davey, supra note 49, at 61. 
267 See McGuire, supra note 259, at 152; cf. Thornton, supra note 89, at 137 (“[T]he 
multinational forum and process really were inadequate to handle a dispute between pow-
erful adversaries with vital economic and industrial interests at stake.”). 
268 See John W. Fisher, Cong. Research Serv., 93–425E, The Airbus Controversy: 
Revisited? 3 (1993); Cunningham & Lichtenbaum, supra note 107, at 1171. 
269 See John W. Fischer et al., Cong. Research Serv., Airbus Industrie: An Eco-
nomic and Trade Perspective 41 (1992) (“Without the GATT committees and dispute 
process, the [parties] might not have an adequate alternative forum and the dispute might 
have ended in a destructive trade war . . . .”). 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 39–44. 
271 See McGuire, supra note 259, at 154–55; cf. supra text accompanying notes 207–214 
(describing the WTO information-providing function, based on earlier GATT dispute 
resolution provisions). 
272 See Marc Benitah, The Law of Subsidies Under the GATT/WTO System 344 
(2001). 
273 Cunningham & Lichtenbaum, supra note 107, at 1172. Such a move seemingly re-
flects American doubt over the Bilateral Agreement’s long-term viability. See id. 
274 See U.S. DSM Filing, supra note 15, at 1–4; Cunningham & Lichtenbaum, supra note 
107, at 1171–72. 
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B. The Contemporary Era and Prospects for Settlement 
 When the two parties filed their consultation and subsequent panel 
requests in 2004 and 2005, commentators predicted that the case would 
generate a range of adverse effects.275 Some argued that the WTO was 
the wrong forum in which to litigate this dispute276 and that the recip-
rocal filings themselves represented the failure of both diplomacy and 
the DSM.277 
                                                                                                                     
 Hindsight improves the picture, and after extensive litigation, set-
tlement is likely.278 While the prospects for a negotiated outcome are 
not certain, they are substantial, given the DSM’s proclivity to generate 
negotiated solutions.279 Additionally, historical patterns in this case also 
support settlement—the years prior to the 1979 and 1992 treaties saw 
increasing confrontation followed by successful negotiation.280 As such, 
this section outlines the factors underlying a negotiated outcome and 
its potential implementation. 
 
275 See Lee, supra note 230, at 156–57 (predicting outcomes that ranged from at best, a 
stalemate that would discredit the WTO, to at worst, a trade war between the world’s two 
most powerful economies in one of its most lucrative sectors). 
276 See, e.g., Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 237–39, 250 (“[T]his dispute should not 
have been brought to the WTO because it is too complex . . . . The DSU [also] has . . . a poor 
track record in resolving high-stakes cases . . . . [it] is not the appropriate forum to resolve 
the dispute between Airbus and Boeing.”); Mathis, supra note 94, at 214 (“[T]his current 
dispute over subsidies and large civil aircraft poses a long-term threat to the WTO’s relevance 
and viability.”); Jens van Scherpenberg & Nicolas Hausséguy, The Airbus-Boeing Dispute: Not for 
the WTO to Solve, Ger. Inst. for Int’l. & Security Aff. (July 2005), http://www.swpberlin. 
org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/comments2005_30_spb_hausseguy_ks.pdf 
(“It is a purely bilateral dispute in which there is no clear division of the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s roles between the two sides.”). 
277 Cf. Mathis, supra note 94, at 214 (“The continuing friction over [the aircraft subsi-
dies dispute] and other trade issues has led some to question the long term efficacy of the 
WTO . . . .”). Curiously, many imply that resolution through the DSM and bilateral chan-
nels are mutually exclusive, thereby failing to see that the former can effectively lead to the 
latter. See, e.g., Mathis, supra note 94, at 203 (citing the negotiated settlement in Bananas as 
evidence of the DSM’s ineffectiveness); Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 248 (“Regardless 
of a possible decision made by the WTO, the parties to the Airbus-Boeing dispute need to 
enter into a new agreement governing subsidies because a decision by the WTO will not 
completely solve the issue of aircraft subsidies.”); Scherpenberg & Hausséguy, supra note 
276, at 7 (“A bilateral U.S.-EU agreement on what constitutes prohibited subsidies and 
what doesn’t . . . is still required. The alternative would be leaving the decision to the WTO 
dispute-settlement body.”). 
278 See Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 128 (“As the resolution in the Bananas saga has 
shown, in those ‘hard cases,’ endless litigation does not offer a way out; negotiation does.”). 
279 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 102–136. 
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1. Factors Underlying a Negotiated Outcome 
 Three factors underlying a negotiated settlement establish the 
foundation for its likelihood: the initial failure of consultations, the ap-
pellate process, and the involvement of third parties.281 
a. The Failure of Consultations 
 Some suggest that parties merely negotiate as a formality because 
the DSM requires it.282 Following this logic, a negotiated outcome is 
unlikely in this case because initial consultations failed.283 If the United 
States and the EU could not be pulled back from the brink of litigation, 
then nothing would be able to restrain them from pushing for and lat-
er instituting damaging retaliatory measures.284 
 Yet expecting consultations to have worked at the outset of this 
case is unrealistic: pro-forma negotiations would have little chance of 
success, especially in light of the parties’ outlooks and viewpoints at the 
time of filing.285 The stakes were too high, and the investment too 
deep, for either party to compromise at the outset.286 But this does not 
necessarily mean that negotiations fail in the long-term.287 The role of 
information availability is crucial:288 as the two sides litigate, the panel 
makes factual and legal determinations that may affect states’ attitudes 
toward the likelihood of victory and thus, the dispute as a whole.289 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
281 See infra text accompanying notes 282–326. 
282 See Porges, supra note 176, at 160. 
283 See Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 211–13. Because the parties spent the consul-
tation phase “quarrelling over the clarity of the other’s request for consultations” rather 
than “discuss[ing] the claims asserted [to] possibly settle the dispute,” the DSM will not 
likely lead to a resolution of the transatlantic aircraft dispute. Id. at 213. 
284 See Nose to Nose—Boeing v Airbus, Economist, June 25, 2005, at 67–69. 
285 See William Drozdiak, The North Atlantic Drift, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 88, 
90 (pointing out the trade-related tensions between the two powers, including the comple-
tion of the Doha Round); Nose to Nose, supra note 284 (noting that Boeing had just wit-
nessed Airbus eclipse its market share and launch the A380, which robbed it of its claim to 
producing the world’s largest passenger aircraft, the 747). The aircraft dispute, in addition 
to being its own long-standing conflict, enabled both sides to express their broader discon-
tent. See Drozdiak, supra note 285, at 90–91. 
286 See Nose to Nose, supra note 284 (describing hardened U.S. and EU attitudes at the 
time of filing). 
287 See Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 135–36. Negotiated settlements can still occur de-
spite the continuing progress of crucial DSU mechanisms, such as the establishment of a 
panel. Id. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 207–218. 
289 See Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 135–36 (“[The] interim review stage—in which the 
panel sends out its interim findings for comments by the parties before it sends out its final 
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DS316 Panel’s identification of some, but not all, subsidies as illicit 
demonstrates this trend.290 Moreover, the dispute’s length has tem-
pered the parties’ attitudes, increasing the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement as both sides are worn down.291 
 The United States and the EU are seemingly less committed to the 
strict implementation of a DSM ruling than they were in 2005— essen-
tially, they had to fail before they could succeed.292 Aborted negotia-
tions followed by protracted litigation, informational availability, and a 
DSM that creates multiple negotiation opportunities can collectively 
draw states away from extreme attitudes, even as they seek sanctions— 
an additional way to generate concessions and ultimately, settlement, 
be it independent or arbitrated.293 
b. The Appellate Process 
 The case’s complexity and the number of appeals generate doubts 
about the imminence and likelihood of an agreement: both imply that 
litigation will continue for some time.294 However, the negotiation ef-
fects inherent to the DSM can mitigate such concerns.295 
 The United States and the EU are the two most experienced liti-
gants in the WTO.296 Moreover, as the DSM has developed, appeals 
                                                                                                                      
report to all WTO Members—could constitute an important gateway to a last minute set-
tlement.”); Porges, supra note 176, at 162. 
290 See DS316 Panel Report, supra note 21, ¶¶ 8.1–.8. By distinguishing between types 
of launch aid provided by different European states, the Panel report provides the EU with 
a platform on which to recalibrate its legal argument, as well as its litigation and negotia-
tion strategies. See id. 
291 See Pilita Clark, Airbus Chief Warns Dispute with Boeing Will Aid Rivals, Fin. Times, 
Oct. 22, 2010, at 6 (quoting Airbus CEO Thomas Enders, who called for a negotiated reso-
lution and labeled the prolonged dispute an “absurdity”). 
292See Julie Johnsson & Kathy Bergen, U.S. Puts Condition on EU Trade Talks, Chi. Trib., 
Apr. 15, 2011, at 28 (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk) (“[A] negotiated resolu-
tion would be the best thing . . . .”); Daniel Pruzin & Len Bracken, U.S., EU Set Out Argu-
ments on Subsidies for Boeing at WTO Appellate Body Hearing, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1492 
(Sept. 15, 2011) (“[EU] trade commissioners, including the current office holder, have 
said they would like to reach a settlement . . . .”). The United States, however, has condi-
tioned its offer to negotiate settlement on a European disavowal of any further subsidies. 
See Johnsson & Bergen, supra. 
293 See Harrington, supra note 27, at 339–40; Miles, supra note 156 (“Although the arbi-
tration process has been triggered, nothing may happen until the two sides have exhausted 
other legal avenues. Many trade experts expect the two sides . . . to attempt to negotiate a 
settlement as the legal appeals and counter-appeals become more and more entangled.”). 
294 See Pruzin, supra note 17. 
295 See discussion supra Part II (outlining the DSM’s inherent and exigent negotiation 
effects). 
296 Conti, supra note 196, at 631. 
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have become routine—between 1995 and 2010, one or both of the dis-
puting parties appealed in 67 percent of cases.297 States are practically 
expected to appeal upon a panel report’s release.298 
 Parties are unlikely to appeal when they commence negotiations 
immediately following the panel report or when the costs of appeal are 
prohibitive.299 In this case, however, immediate post-report negotiations 
did not occur, and given the size and power of the United States and 
the EU, cost is not an obstacle.300 
 Moreover, an appeal gives the parties an opportunity to gain fur-
ther-defined rules and norms,301 which will, as with other DSM cases, 
guide the eventual negotiation process.302 For example, the AB hearings 
in DS316 saw the United States and the EU specifically focus on several 
of the Panel’s decisions relating to infrastructure development,303 the 
length of subsidy benefits,304 and capital contributions.305 The AB had 
heretofore not addressed these issues with regard to LCA and the 
ASCM.306 
 Because both sides have invested so much time and money into 
the proceedings, they will likely wait for the AB’s rulings before negoti-
                                                                                                                      
297 Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2010, 5, WT/AB/15 ( July 18, 2011). 
298 See Konstantin J. Joergens, True Appellate Procedure or Only a Two-Stage Process? A Com-
parative View of the Appellate Body Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 30 Law & 
Pol’y Int’l Bus. 193, 221 (1999) (“[T]he more legalistic approach embodied in the addi-
tion of the Appellate Body might require frequent use of the right of appeal to make the 
system work.”). 
299 See Jackson, supra note 19, at 189; Pauwelyn, supra note 177, at 135–36. 
300 See Conti, supra note 196, at 652–53 (“The United States [and the EU have] the 
personnel, organization, and resources necessary to manage litigation, even multiple si-
multaneous disputes.”); supra text accompanying notes 152, 159 (noting that both parties 
appealed both panel reports). 
301 See Conti, supra note 196, at 632. 
302 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 231–237 (discussing negotiations in EC–Bananas). 
303 See Opening Statement of the European Union at the First Hearing, European Commu-
nities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 108, AB-2010–
1/DS316 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/novem- 
ber/tradoc_147021.pdf [hereinafter EU AB Opening Statement]; Oral Statement of the 
United States at the First Oral Hearing, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 81, AB-2010–1/DS316 (Nov. 11, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2386 [hereinafter U.S. AB Oral Statement]. 
304 See EU AB Opening Statement, supra note 303, ¶ 11; U.S. AB Oral Statement, supra 
note 303, ¶ 19. 
305 See EU AB Opening Statement, supra note 303, ¶¶ 121–123; U.S. AB Oral State-
ment, supra note 303, ¶ 86. 
306 Cf. Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 6, at 236–37, 242–43 (highlighting the ability of the 
WTO to create new legal standards in this case). 
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ating further.307 But when both rulings emerge, the United States and 
the EU will possess an unprecedented amount of information,308 allow-
ing both to recalibrate their positions with new legal norms.309 Thus, 
appeal reflects not only experience litigating before the DSM, but also 
an acknowledgement by both sides that they seek more information 
and interaction—factors that have proven to lead states to the bargain-
ing table.310 
c. Third Parties and Changing Market Conditions 
 The final element that will contribute to a negotiated resolution 
involves the DSM’s third-party mechanism.311 Third-party concerns 
force the disputants to focus on the bigger picture, thereby encourag-
ing settlement.312 When they filed their panel requests, both parties 
sought consultations under Article XXIII, thus enabling third parties to 
participate in negotiations.313 The third parties include Brazil, Canada, 
and China,314 all of which host firms that are planning products to 
compete with those of Boeing and Airbus.315 
 Theory and empirical evidence suggest that third-party involve-
ment will influence U.S. and EU policymakers.316 The complaints and 
concerns in this case represent those of countries whose firms are 
locked in a duopoly that is on the verge of cessation.317 Yet the United 
                                                                                                                      
307 Cf. Porges, supra note 176, at 168 (noting parties’ commitment to the completion 
of panel proceedings once they have commenced). 
308 See Thornton, supra note 89, at 138–45 (discussing both sides’ information-
gathering techniques throughout this dispute). Much of the conflict has its roots in legal 
loopholes (for example, Airbus’s corporate structure for its first thirty years exempted it 
from reporting financial results) that generated ambiguity. See id. at 88–93. Through the 
DSM process, the two sides will now have access to facts and figures that were previously 
unattainable. See id. at 138–145. 
309 See Conti, supra note 196, at 632. 
310 See supra text accompanying notes 196–218. 
311 See DSU, supra note 57, art. 4.11, 10; GATT 1947, supra note 41, art. XXIII:2. 
312 See supra text accompanying note 189. 
313 See EU DSM Filing, supra note 16, at 1; U.S. DSM Filing, supra note 15, at 1. 
314 Dispute DS316: European Communities–Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
315 Kyle James, Airbus Chief Says Subsidy Spat with Boeing Helps Emerging Rivals, Deutsche 
Welle (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6140280,00.html. 
316 See Davey & Porges, supra note 189, at 700–02. For example, Airbus CEO Tom En-
ders noted that the DSM dispute could hasten the competitive entry of new rivals and 
asked whether, upon a DSM decision, “anyone . . . believe[s] that they will step back and 
say: ‘Now we understand the WTO rules, we will play exactly by the rules’? . . . Absolutely 
not . . . .” James, supra note 315. 
317 See James, supra note 315. 
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States and the EU realize that, no matter what the AB decides, its rules 
will apply in an industry with new players who will likely react in their 
own unique ways.318 
 By providing third-party involvement, the DSM has endowed the 
United States and the EU with an ability to make explicit choices about 
how to move forward based on third-party attitudes.319 The two sides 
could thus create an agreement permitting forms of subsidization that 
favor their production methods, as opposed to those of competitors 
that threaten their market share.320 
 Alternatively, the United States and the EU could take a more mul-
tilateral approach and include new market entrants in any eventual 
agreement.321 They have already begun to do so: the United States, EU, 
Brazil, Canada, and Japan negotiated the December 2010 Aviation Sec-
tor Understanding (ASU) through the OECD.322 The ASU regulates 
government export credits for commercial aircraft and may expand to 
China and Russia.323 
 The enactment of and multilateral involvement inherent to the 
ASU demonstrate a willingness to negotiate, even if it only concerns 
one form of subsidization and does not resolve the transatlantic dis-
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standing, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 345, (Mar. 3, 2011). 
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pute.324 Yet as one WTO official noted, the proclivity to include third 
parties is more a sign of the U.S. and EU’s acknowledgement that the 
“real world is changing,” rather than any structural effect inherent in 
the DSM.325 The DSM’s third-party mechanism, however, enables dis-
puting parties to further recognize this and plan accordingly.326 
2. The Implementation of a Negotiated Outcome 
 Once a negotiated solution is likely, the question arises of how to 
implement and reconcile it with DSB decisions.327 Three outcomes are 
possible: the parties could (a) seek a waiver concerning aircraft subsidi-
zation;328 (b) attempt to integrate any potential agreement into the 
current Doha Round;329 or (c) let the conflict settle with time.330 
a. Waiver 
 Under Article IX:3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, Mem-
ber States may seek waivers of certain provisions “[i]n exceptional cir-
cumstances.”331 The United States and the EU could thus approach the 
WTO Ministerial Conference and ask for a waiver from relevant ASCM 
provisions.332 This approach is fraught with challenges—because waivers 
require parties to admit explicit violations of WTO provisions, and the 
United States and the EU have largely denied LCA subsidization, such a 
tacit admission is unlikely.333 
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 The two parties would also have to engage the WTO in a lengthy 
process entailing significant hurdles—at least a three-fourths majority 
decision of the Ministerial Conference is needed for a waiver.334 Finally, 
a waiver would constitute effective permission for potential competitors 
to subsidize aircraft production, as waivers suspend obligations for ei-
ther all Member States or individual groups.335 A waiver would thus 
presumably apply to all WTO members that manufacture commercial 
aircraft.336 
b. Integration into the Doha Round 
 Alternatively, the United States, the EU, and other potential par-
ties to an agreement regarding aircraft subsidization could integrate it 
into the Doha Round.337 Due to multiple delays and despite the stated 
goal of finishing the Round by late 2011,338 it will not likely be con-
cluded until “2012 and possibly beyond.”339 This provides an opportu-
nity for the parties to integrate an aircraft agreement into Doha, as they 
did during the Tokyo Round.340 
 Granted, the odds of success are moderate at best, given the con-
troversies surrounding the aircraft dispute and the Doha Round, as well 
as the limited timeframe.341 However, states could take advantage of the 
ASU, negotiated through the OECD, and the Doha Round, negotiated 
through the WTO, to integrate the former into the latter, rather than 
working through each organization separately.342 
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c. Settlement over Time 
 Finally, the parties could negotiate an agreement regardless of the 
AB’s decision; such outcomes have occurred in particularly contentious 
cases such as Bananas and Brazil/Canada–Aircraft.343 This result, however, 
may engender doubt about the DSM’s enforcement ability.344 Previous 
cases such as Canada–Aircraft led to rulings whose measures were not 
implemented,345 though the system remained intact and states contin-
ued to treat it seriously.346 Some argue that an outcome akin to that in 
Canada–Aircraft would be a “waste of time.”347 Yet Brazil/Canada evolved 
from Brazil’s desire to prove itself as an economic power vis-à-vis Can-
ada.348 There is no such disparity here.349 
 In short, a ruling without implementation can still be useful be-
cause the DSM’s primary goal is to lead states to mutually agreeable out-
comes.350 Concomitant with this goal, a decision followed by a lack of 
retaliation demonstrates a positive outcome, as inaction could signify 
the parties’ satisfaction with the end result.351 A lack of compliance in a 
few cases will not undo a half-century of GATT/WTO development that 
has repeatedly catalyzed international cooperation.352 
 The United States and the EU have invested a great deal of time, 
money, and political capital into resolving this dispute.353 But its history 
demonstrates that they are more likely than not to attempt resolution 
through negotiation.354 This, along with a DSM that pushes states to 
negotiate, means that a negotiated settlement to the most recent round 
of this rivalry is likely.355 
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Conclusion 
 Despite its length and recalcitrance, the aircraft dispute between 
the United States and the EU will likely generate a negotiated settle-
ment. The likelihood of this outcome is apparent considering the set-
tlement-oriented nature of the DSM and its extrinsic effects, along with 
the history and nature of the aircraft dispute. 
 With the DSM, WTO members created enforcement mechanisms 
to improve an ineffective dispute settlement system. Yet they could not 
escape its foundations and the fact that states value autonomy. The 
DSM reconciles these concerns; by providing a legalized system, the 
WTO brings scofflaw countries into conformity with international 
rules. Through negotiation opportunities, it encourages experienced 
rational actors to consult early and frequently to seize the opportunity 
for settlement. Extrinsic factors, including state development and DSB 
experience; informational availability; and the prospect of binding 
compliance measures further cause disputing parties, in different cases, 
to choose litigation or settlement. Even with litigation, some states use 
DSB decisions as a foundation for negotiated settlements. 
 From a practical perspective, these observations are crucial for 
those who litigate before the WTO. The fact that the DSM is aimed at 
long-term negotiated solutions can profoundly affect how government 
and private attorneys approach certain cases, taking into consideration 
issues such as their representative state’s experience with the DSB, its 
level of development, and individual points in the DSM timeline that 
they can utilize in order to settle with the other side. 
 As history shows, this is not the first time that the two parties come 
to the brink of a trade war over LCA: the 1970s and 1980s saw periods 
of escalation followed by settlement, first through the Tokyo Round, 
and later through bilateral talks. In each instance, the GATT enabled 
both sides to air their grievances before negotiating a solution. This 
dispute has operated in cycles of interstate conflict followed by coop-
eration, none of which catalyzed a trade war. The DSM provides further 
reason to believe that this era is no different. 
 The entry of new competitors will also exert pressure on the two 
rivals to resolve their conflict, as delays will put the United States and 
the EU at greater risk of losing their market position. Granted, settle-
ment will not eliminate new rivals. Rather, both sides will recognize that 
they are better served when they are not constantly at odds over subsi-
dies, which only distracts them from larger issues. 
 Nor will a negotiated settlement necessarily provide a lasting reso-
lution. As long as Boeing and Airbus exist, their home governments will 
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find something to contest. As they face new competition, the United 
States and the EU may even intensify their use of rhetoric and legal 
mechanisms with regards to LCA; it will just be aimed at other states. 
They may even ironically find themselves, after thirty years of rivalry, on 
the same side of this hotly contested issue. 
